Administrative Law
Dwarka Nath v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
AIR 1971 SC 1844
- Citation
- AIR 1971 SC 1844
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date
- 23 April 1971
- Bench
- C.A. Vaidyialingam, S.M. Sikri and A.N. Ray, JJ.
Facts
- The appellants manufactured/sold ghee in Delhi.
- Food Inspectors found that the label on the ghee tin did not fully comply with Rule 32(b) and Rule 32(e) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.
- Rule 32(b) required the name and business address of the manufacturer/vendor/packer.
- Rule 32(e) required a batch number or code number on the label.
- The appellants challenged these rules as being beyond the rule-making power under Section 23 of the Act.
Issue
- Whether Rule 32(b) and Rule 32(e) were ultra vires Section 23 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Rule
- Delegated legislation must remain within the limits of the parent Act.
- A rule cannot go beyond the object and purpose for which rule-making power is given.
- If the parent Act allows rules for preventing deception about the character, quality or quantity of food, the rule must actually serve that purpose.
Application
- The Court examined Section 23 carefully.
- Section 23 allowed the Central Government to make labelling rules with a view to preventing the public or purchaser from being deceived or misled about the food article.
- For Rule 32(b):
- Requiring the name and business address of the manufacturer/vendor/packer was connected to the statutory purpose.
- In food business, the name and address may be associated with quality, reputation and accountability.
- Therefore, this rule helped the purchaser identify the source of the product and was within the rule-making power.
- For Rule 32(e):
- The Court said that merely putting an artificial batch number or code number did not, by itself, tell the purchaser anything useful.
- It did not show date of manufacture, expiry, quantity, quality, or safety.
- So, it did not really prevent deception about the character, quality or quantity of the ghee.
- Therefore, Rule 32(e) travelled beyond the purpose allowed by Section 23.
Conclusion
- Rule 32(b) was held valid.
- Rule 32(e) was held ultra vires the parent Act.
- The appellants’ conviction under Rule 32(e) could not stand.
- As to Rule 32(b), the Court said there was only a technical breach because some address was given, though not fully detailed.
- Since the lower courts had convicted them considering both Rule 32(b) and invalid Rule 32(e), the convictions were set aside.
- Use this case for: a delegated rule must have a real connection with the purpose of the parent statute; otherwise it is substantively ultra vires.