Alternative Dispute Resolution
Aravali Power Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Era Infra Engineering Ltd.
(2017) 15 SCC 32
- Citation
- (2017) 15 SCC 32
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Date
- 12 September 2017
- Bench
- R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Facts
- Aravali Power Company awarded construction work to Era Infra Engineering.
- The contract contained an arbitration clause providing for appointment through a mechanism controlled by the employer.
- Disputes arose concerning execution and payment.
- Era Infra invoked arbitration.
- The contractual authority nominated an arbitrator who was connected with the public-sector or employer-side establishment.
- Era Infra objected and sought an independent appointment.
- The High Court appointed an arbitrator outside the contractual mechanism.
- Aravali Power appealed.
- A major question was whether the 2015 amendments introducing Section 12(5) applied to:
- the arbitration agreement;
- the date of invocation;
- the appointment; and
- the pending proceedings.
- The relevant invocation and appointment process had begun before the amended neutrality provisions took effect.
Issue
- Whether the post-2015 disqualification regime applied retrospectively.
- Whether the High Court could disregard the contractual appointment clause under the earlier law.
- Whether an employee or panel-connected arbitrator was automatically invalid before Section 12(5).
Rule
- The 2015 amendment generally applies prospectively according to the statutory transitional provision and the date on which arbitral proceedings commenced.
- Before Section 12(5):
- employee status or connection with one party did not automatically produce ineligibility;
- specific circumstances establishing reasonable apprehension of bias were required.
- Courts were expected to follow the agreed appointment mechanism unless it:
- failed;
- became impossible;
- violated then-existing law; or
- involved a person directly connected with the disputed decisions.
- The current position is materially different after:
- Section 12(5);
- the Seventh Schedule;
- TRF;
- Perkins Eastman;
- CORE; and
- Bhadra International.
Application
- The Court determined that the appointment process was governed by the legal regime existing before the 2015 amendments.
- It therefore declined to apply Section 12(5) retrospectively.
- Under the earlier framework, the mere fact that the proposed arbitrator:
- was an employee;
- had public-sector experience; or
- appeared on an employer-connected panel did not automatically terminate their eligibility.
- Era Infra had to demonstrate a concrete ground of bias or incapacity.
- No sufficient material showed that the appointee:
- participated in the termination or disputed certification;
- possessed a financial interest;
- had expressed a concluded view; or
- was otherwise legally incapable.
- The High Court had replaced the agreed process largely because it preferred an independent retired judge.
- The Supreme Court held that this was insufficient under the then-applicable law.
- Party autonomy required the contractual mechanism to be respected.
- The judgment is historically important but cannot be applied mechanically to modern appointments.
- Today, even a professionally independent nominee may be invalid if:
- the appointing party has exclusive unilateral control over a sole arbitrator;
- the appointing authority is itself interested in the outcome;
- the panel is structurally unequal; or
- the proposed arbitrator falls within the Seventh Schedule.
- CORE also applies equality at the appointment stage, while Bhadra confirms that mere participation does not cure a unilateral appointment without express post-dispute written waiver.
- Consequently, Aravali Power chiefly explains:
- the transitional position;
- why old appointments were judged under old law; and
- the pre-amendment rule of contractual deference.
Conclusion
- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s independent appointment.
- It held that the pre-2015 contractual mechanism governed and that employee or panel connection alone did not then create automatic disqualification.
- The case’s appointment principle is limited for post-2015 arbitrations.
- Use this case for: the pre-amendment appointment regime and the prospective operation of the stricter Section 12(5) neutrality rules.