Alternative Dispute Resolution

C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera

2026 INSC 112

Citation: 2026 INSC 112
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 3 February 2026
Bench: Division Bench (Supreme Court of India)

Facts

The parties entered into three agreements to sell immovable property.
Disputes arose and the High Court appointed a sole arbitrator under Section 11.
The statutory period for making the award expired under Section 29A.
No timely extension had been granted before expiry.
The arbitrator nevertheless proceeded and delivered an award after the mandate had lapsed.
An application was later filed under Section 29A seeking extension of the arbitrator’s mandate.
The High Court held that it could not entertain the application because:
the award had already been made;
Section 29A referred to extension where an award “is not made”;
and a post-award extension would impermissibly validate a completed act.
The dispute reached the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether a court may entertain a Section 29A application after the arbitrator has made an award beyond the expired mandate.
What is the legal status of an award made without a subsisting mandate.
Whether the court’s power of extension is destroyed by the arbitrator’s late act.

Rule

The court may extend the mandate:
before expiry;
after expiry;
and even after the arbitrator has purported to make a late award.
Section 29A does not prescribe an outer limitation period for the court’s extension power.
The arbitrator’s unilateral act cannot deprive the court of statutory jurisdiction.
Until the court grants an appropriate extension:
an award made after mandate expiry is without operative enforceability;
it does not acquire decree-like force under Section 36;
and need not necessarily be challenged as an ordinary valid award under Section 34.
While deciding extension, the court may:
examine delay;
impose costs;
reduce fees;
substitute one or more arbitrators;
and issue directions protecting integrity and expedition.
Extension is discretionary, not automatic.

Application

The Supreme Court examined the purpose of Section 29A.
Parliament introduced timelines to:
prevent indefinitely delayed arbitration;
promote efficiency;
and preserve confidence in the process.
It did not intend mandate expiry to automatically destroy years of proceedings where a court considers extension justified.
The word “terminates” in Section 29A is therefore conditional and capable of being reversed through judicial extension.
The arbitrator acted improperly by making an award after expiry.
However, that indiscretion could not eliminate the court’s independent statutory power.
Otherwise, a late arbitrator could determine the court’s jurisdiction merely by issuing an unauthorised document.
The High Court was therefore required to consider the extension application on its merits.
It had to examine:
why the award was delayed;
whether either party caused the delay;
whether the arbitrator should continue;
whether substitution was required;
and what costs or fee consequences should follow.
The Supreme Court clarified that the late document is not automatically treated as a valid enforceable award merely because it exists.
Its legal effectiveness depends upon the court’s eventual Section 29A decision and directions.
Delay by itself does not always establish public-policy invalidity.
But unexplained delay that affects reasoning or fairness may create additional concerns.
The judgment also confirms that the competent “Court” for Section 29A is the court defined by Section 2(1)(e), not necessarily the Supreme Court or High Court that made the Section 11 appointment.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that a Section 29A application remains maintainable even after a late award has been delivered.
The arbitrator’s expired mandate does not destroy the court’s extension jurisdiction.
The late award remains unenforceable unless and until the court passes appropriate orders.
Use this case for: post-expiry and post-award extension of an arbitrator’s mandate under Section 29A.