Judgement Briefs

Civil Procedure Law

Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd.

(2005) 7 SCC 791

Citation
(2005) 7 SCC 791
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
26 September 2005
Bench
Arijit Pasayat and C.K. Thakker, JJ.

Facts

  • Harshad Chiman Lal Modi entered into a plot-buyer agreement with DLF Universal Ltd. for purchase of a residential plot in DLF Qutub Enclave, Gurgaon, Haryana.
  • The agreement was made in Delhi.
  • DLF’s head office was situated in Delhi, payments were to be made there, and the agreement contained a clause referring disputes to Delhi courts.
  • DLF later cancelled the allotment.
  • The purchaser filed a suit in Delhi seeking:
  • Declarations;
  • Specific performance;
  • Execution of the sale deed;
  • Permanent injunction; and
  • Delivery of possession of the Gurgaon plot.
  • DLF originally admitted Delhi jurisdiction in its written statement.
  • Years later, it amended the pleading and objected that Section 16 CPC required filing where the property was situated.
  • The Delhi trial court accepted the objection and ordered return of the plaint for presentation before the proper court in Gurgaon.
  • The Delhi High Court affirmed that order.
  • The purchaser appealed, relying upon:
  • The contractual jurisdiction clause;
  • The defendants’ original admission;
  • The Delhi-based contractual events; and
  • The proviso to Section 16.

Issues

  • Whether a suit seeking specific performance and possession of immovable property must be filed where the property is situated under Section 16 CPC.
  • Whether the proviso to Section 16 permitted the Delhi court to act through the defendants’ personal obedience.
  • Whether Section 20 CPC or the parties’ Delhi jurisdiction clause could confer jurisdiction despite Section 16.
  • Whether DLF’s earlier admission prevented it from raising the jurisdictional objection.

Rule

  • Sections 15 to 20 CPC form a connected scheme governing the place of suing.
  • Section 16 requires suits concerning:
  • Recovery of immovable property;
  • Partition;
  • Mortgage rights;
  • Determination of rights or interests in immovable property; and
  • Wrongs to immovable property to be filed where the property is situated.
  • Section 20 is residuary.
  • Its opening words, “subject to the limitations aforesaid,” mean that it applies only where Sections 15 to 19 do not govern.
  • The proviso to Section 16 applies where the entire relief can be obtained through the defendant’s personal obedience.
  • It is an exception and cannot enlarge the main provision.
  • Parties may choose between two competent courts, but they cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court that inherently lacks it.
  • An admission, waiver or consent cannot cure lack of inherent jurisdiction.

Application

  • The suit was not merely for damages for breach of an agreement.
  • The purchaser sought:
  • Execution of a sale deed concerning an identified Gurgaon plot;
  • Protection against its transfer; and
  • Delivery of possession.
  • These prayers required determination and enforcement of rights in property outside Delhi.
  • The suit therefore fell directly within Section 16(d).
  • The Delhi connections—the place of agreement, payment and DLF’s head office—would have been relevant under Section 20 in a personal action.
  • They could not override the special rule in Section 16 because Section 20 is expressly subordinate to the preceding limitations.
  • The proviso also did not apply.
  • Although a court can sometimes compel a defendant personally to perform obligations relating to property outside its territory, the relief here was not wholly enforceable through personal obedience.
  • The decree would:
  • Directly affect rights in the Gurgaon property; and
  • Require delivery of its possession.
  • Effective adjudication therefore belonged to the court having territorial control over the property.
  • The contractual clause selecting Delhi could operate only if Delhi was independently competent.
  • Unlike a case involving two lawful forums, Gurgaon was the mandatory forum under Section 16 and Delhi lacked inherent power over the property dispute.
  • DLF’s admission in the original written statement made no difference.
  • Jurisdiction arises from law, not from pleading or agreement.
  • The objection was not merely about the convenient place of suing. It went to the Delhi court’s authority to adjudicate rights in the property.

Held

  • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
  • It upheld return of the plaint for presentation before the competent Gurgaon court.
  • The suit for specific performance, possession and related relief concerning the Gurgaon plot was governed by the main part of Section 16.
  • The proviso to Section 16 and Section 20 were inapplicable.
  • The Delhi jurisdiction clause and DLF’s earlier admission could not confer authority upon a court that lacked inherent jurisdiction.
  • Use this case for: Suits directly concerning rights in and possession of immovable property must ordinarily be filed where the property is situated, and consent cannot displace Section 16.