Civil Procedure Law

Inbasagaran v. S. Natarajan

(2015) 11 SCC 12

Facts

S. Natarajan agreed to sell land to Inbasagaran and another purchaser.
Part of the sale consideration was paid and possession of the property was delivered to the purchasers.
The purchasers later alleged that Natarajan attempted forcibly to dispossess them and interfere with their enjoyment.
They filed the first suit seeking a permanent injunction against interference with possession.
That suit was based principally on the alleged attempt to trespass and remove their workers.
Soon afterwards, the purchasers filed a separate suit seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale.
Natarajan argued that the second suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 because:
Both suits arose from the same sale agreement;
The purchasers could have sought specific performance in the first suit; and
No leave had been obtained.
The courts had to determine whether the causes of action were truly identical.

Whether both suits arose from the same cause of action.
Whether common reliance on the same agreement was sufficient to trigger Order II Rule 2.
Whether the specific-performance relief had necessarily been omitted from the first cause of action.

Order II Rule 2 is attracted only where the cause of action in both suits is the same.
A cause of action is the complete bundle of material facts necessary to establish the right to relief.
The fact that two suits concern:
The same agreement;
The same property; or
The same parties does not automatically establish identity of cause of action.
A possessory injunction may arise from:
An act of trespass;
Threatened dispossession; or
Interference with existing possession.
Specific performance arises from:
A binding agreement;
The plaintiff’s readiness and willingness;
The defendant’s failure or refusal to perform; and
The right to compel conveyance.
If these factual bundles are materially different, the second suit is not barred.
The defendant bears the burden of establishing every ingredient of Order II Rule 2.

The first suit was not founded on a refusal to execute the sale deed.
Its immediate cause was Natarajan’s alleged attempt to:
Enter the property forcibly;
Remove the purchasers’ workers; and
Disturb possession already delivered under the agreement.
To succeed in that suit, the purchasers principally had to prove:
Their possession; and
Threatened unlawful interference.
They did not necessarily have to prove every ingredient of specific performance.
The later suit required a different factual inquiry:
Validity and enforceability of the agreement;
Payment or tender of consideration;
Readiness and willingness; and
Failure by the vendor to execute the conveyance.
Although the agreement explained how the purchasers entered possession, it did not make the two causes of action identical.
The Court distinguished Virgo Industries:
In Virgo, the earlier injunction plaint itself pleaded refusal to perform, so the right to specific performance was already part of the same factual bundle.
Here, the first suit was triggered by a separate possessory threat.
Order II Rule 2 cannot be expanded merely because procedural economy might have allowed both claims to be combined.
The rule bars omitted reliefs arising from the same cause of action, not every relief that could conveniently have been joined.

The Supreme Court held that the specific-performance suit was not barred.
The first cause of action concerned protection of possession from forcible interference; the second concerned enforcement of the sale agreement.
The material facts required for the two reliefs were not identical.
Use this case for: The same agreement and property may generate distinct causes of action for possessory injunction and specific performance.