Civil Procedure Law

Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi

(2024) 5 SCC 815

Facts

T.K.D. Keerthi instituted a commercial suit and sought urgent interim relief.
The suit was filed without first undergoing pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.
Yamini Manohar, the defendant, applied for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
She argued that:
Pre-institution mediation was mandatory under Patil Automation;
Merely inserting an interim-relief prayer should not permit the plaintiff to bypass Section 12A; and
A formal exemption application had not been filed.
The Commercial Court rejected the application.
The Delhi High Court upheld that order.
The defendant approached the Supreme Court.
The Court had to clarify how a commercial court should determine whether a suit genuinely “contemplates any urgent interim relief.”

Whether a separate application seeking exemption from Section 12A is mandatory.
How courts should determine whether a suit contemplates urgent interim relief.
Whether eventual refusal of interim relief means that the suit was required to undergo pre-institution mediation.
How courts should prevent sham urgency from defeating Section 12A.

Section 12A applies only to a suit which does not contemplate urgent interim relief.
“Contemplate” means to deliberate upon or genuinely consider such relief.
No statutory provision requires a separate exemption application.
The requirement may be assessed from:
The plaint;
Documents;
Cause of action;
Nature and subject matter of the suit;
Interim prayers; and
Oral submissions.
The court must conduct a limited but real examination.
A prayer for urgency cannot be:
A disguise;
A mask; or
An unfounded excuse inserted merely to avoid mediation.
However, the court should not decide the final merits of the interim application at the threshold.
Failure to obtain ad interim relief does not retrospectively make Section 12A applicable.
Interim relief may legitimately be considered or granted after notice.

The plaintiff had expressly sought urgent interim protection.
The relevant pleadings and subject matter demonstrated that the prayer was part of the suit actually framed, not an afterthought added after objection.
The statutory condition was therefore satisfied: the suit contemplated urgent interim relief.
Yamini Manohar argued that an exemption application was necessary.
The Supreme Court rejected this because Section 12A contains no equivalent of the leave procedure found in Section 80(2) CPC.
Courts cannot create a mandatory application requirement absent from the statute.
An application may still be useful because it:
Explains urgency;
Assists judicial scrutiny; and
Reduces later disputes.
But its absence does not invalidate the suit.
The Court also rejected an outcome-based test.
Whether interim relief is ultimately granted depends upon:
Prima facie case;
Balance of convenience;
Irreparable harm; and
Other circumstances.
A plaintiff may genuinely require urgent consideration but still fail to satisfy those tests.
Therefore, non-grant of immediate relief cannot alone justify rejection of the plaint.
The correct inquiry is whether, viewed holistically from the plaintiff’s standpoint, the suit reasonably contemplated urgent protection when instituted.

The Supreme Court dismissed Yamini Manohar’s challenge.
The Order VII Rule 11 application had been correctly rejected.
No separate exemption application was mandatory, and the suit genuinely contemplated urgent interim relief.
Commercial courts must scrutinise urgency without converting the preliminary inquiry into a full decision on interim merits.
Use this case for: A genuine urgent interim-relief suit bypasses Section 12A without a formal exemption application, but courts must detect artificial urgency.