Constitutional Law

Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh

AIR 1955 SC 781

Citation: AIR 1955 SC 781
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 29 September 1955
Bench: Sudhi Ranjan Das C.J.; N.H. Bhagwati; T.L. Venkatarama Ayyar; S. Jaffer Imam; N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar

Facts

The petitioners were private stage-carriage operators carrying on transport businesses in Madhya Pradesh.
Before the Constitution, the C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 had amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
The amendment gave the Provincial Government extensive powers to operate motor transport services and create a State monopoly, excluding private operators from selected routes.
When the Constitution came into force, this law conflicted with the citizens’ right to carry on a trade or business under Article 19(1)(g).
At that time, Article 19(6) did not expressly authorise the State to create a complete or partial business monopoly.
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 subsequently amended Article 19(6) and expressly permitted State monopolies.
In 1955, the Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification proposing to take over specified transport routes.
The private operators challenged the notification, arguing that the earlier law had become completely void under Article 13(1) and could not revive without re-enactment.

Issue

Whether the pre-Constitution amendment became completely dead when it conflicted with Article 19(1)(g).
Whether the subsequent amendment of Article 19(6) could revive the existing law.
Whether a fresh legislative enactment was necessary before the State could create the transport monopoly.
Whether the 1955 notification was constitutionally valid.

Rule

A pre-Constitution law inconsistent with a fundamental right is not erased from the statute book.
Under Article 13(1), it becomes inoperative only to the extent that it obstructs the exercise of that fundamental right.
The law remains valid for:
past transactions and accrued liabilities;
persons who cannot claim the particular fundamental right; and
future operation if the constitutional inconsistency is removed.
This temporary inoperativeness is described as the doctrine of eclipse.
When the constitutional prohibition is removed, the shadow is lifted and the law becomes operative without re-enactment.

Application

The Court first noted that the 1947 amendment was valid when originally enacted because fundamental rights did not then exist.
After 26 January 1950, the provisions authorising the exclusion of private transport operators conflicted with Article 19(1)(g), read with the original Article 19(6).
However, this inconsistency did not destroy the law.
The law remained written in the statute book and continued to operate regarding matters not protected by Article 19(1)(g), including its application to non-citizens.
For citizens seeking to carry on transport businesses, the law was temporarily blocked by Article 19(1)(g).
The Court described the fundamental right as casting a shadow over the existing law.
The First Amendment altered Article 19(6) by expressly permitting the State to carry on a trade, business, industry or service to the complete or partial exclusion of citizens.
Once this amendment came into force, the conflict between the transport law and Article 19 disappeared.
Since the law had never been completely repealed or extinguished, no fresh enactment was necessary.
The constitutional amendment removed the eclipse, allowing the law to operate again from the date of the amendment.
The law could not create rights or liabilities for the period during which it remained eclipsed, but it could support fresh governmental action taken after the inconsistency was removed.
The notification proposing the State takeover was issued after Article 19(6) had been amended and was therefore supported by a valid and operative law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the 1947 amendment had not become dead or void for every purpose.
It had merely become dormant regarding citizens’ rights under Article 19(1)(g).
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act removed the constitutional inconsistency and revived its operation.
Re-enactment by the State Legislature was unnecessary.
The notification proposing the nationalisation of the specified transport routes was constitutionally valid.