Constitutional Law

I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of Tamil Nadu

(2007) 2 SCC 1

Citation: (2007) 2 SCC 1
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 11 January 2007
Bench: Y.K. Sabharwal C.J.; Ashok Bhan; Arijit Pasayat; B.P. Singh; S.H. Kapadia; C.K. Thakker; P.K. Balasubramanyan; Altamas Kabir; D.K. Jain

Facts

Article 31B protects laws placed in the Ninth Schedule from invalidation for violating fundamental rights.
The Ninth Schedule was originally designed mainly to protect land-reform legislation.
Over time, Parliament inserted many different laws into it.
Some laws were added after they had already faced or failed judicial scrutiny.
Questions arose regarding laws such as the Tamil Nadu Janmam Estates Act and West Bengal land legislation.
The Court had previously held in Waman Rao that constitutional amendments inserting laws into the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973—the date of Kesavananda Bharati—could be reviewed under the basic-structure doctrine.
A nine-judge Bench was asked to clarify how such review should operate.

Whether laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after Kesavananda Bharati are completely immune from judicial review.
Whether Article 31B may be used to protect laws that damage the basic structure.
Whether every violation of a fundamental right automatically violates the basic structure.
What test should courts apply to Ninth Schedule legislation.

Parliament may amend the Constitution and add legislation to the Ninth Schedule.
That amendment remains subject to the basic-structure doctrine.
Judicial review itself is a basic feature.
Fundamental rights such as Articles 14, 19 and 21 reflect deeper constitutional principles including:
equality;
liberty;
dignity;
rule of law; and
limited government.
A law is not invalid merely because it violates any fundamental right.
The court must examine the actual effect or impact of the protected law upon the basic structure.
The protection of Article 31B cannot be used as a constitutional device for destroying foundational principles.

The Court rejected the argument that insertion into the Ninth Schedule created absolute immunity.
Parliament could otherwise achieve indirectly what it could not do directly.
For example, it could enact a law abolishing equality or judicial independence and then place it in the Ninth Schedule.
This would make the basic-structure doctrine meaningless.
The Court treated the constitutional amendment inserting the law and the protected law’s actual content as connected.
The relevant inquiry was:
which fundamental right is affected;
what constitutional principle that right represents; and
whether the injury is so serious that the basic structure is damaged.
Articles 14, 19 and 21 were given particular importance because they form a connected framework protecting freedom and dignity.
However, the Court avoided converting every ordinary rights violation into a basic-structure violation.
The impact must reach a foundational constitutional level.
The Court retained the cut-off date of 24 April 1973.
Laws inserted before that date were generally protected because of the finality recognised in Waman Rao.
Post-Kesavananda insertions could be challenged even if Parliament had used Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule.

The nine-judge Bench unanimously held that every Ninth Schedule insertion made after 24 April 1973 is subject to basic-structure review.
Article 31B does not create absolute immunity.
Courts must apply the impact or effect test to determine whether the protected law damages foundational constitutional principles.