Constitutional Law

Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India

AIR 1995 SC 605; (1994) 6 SCC 360

Citation: AIR 1995 SC 605; (1994) 6 SCC 360
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 24 October 1994
Bench: M.N. Venkatachaliah C.J.; A.M. Ahmadi; J.S. Verma; G.N. Ray; S.P. Bharucha

Facts

The Babri Masjid at Ayodhya was demolished on 6 December 1992 during the dispute concerning the claimed birthplace of Lord Ram.
Parliament enacted the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993.
The Act acquired the disputed site and surrounding land and transferred it to the Central Government.
Section 4(3) caused pending suits and legal proceedings concerning the disputed property to abate.
The President also made a reference under Article 143 asking whether a Hindu religious structure had existed at the disputed site before construction of the mosque.
Muslim and Hindu parties challenged different aspects of the acquisition.
The constitutional questions included secularism, acquisition of religious property and protection of worship under Articles 25 and 26.

Whether Parliament could acquire a mosque or other religious property.
Whether acquisition violated Articles 25 and 26 or the constitutional principle of secularism.
Whether extinguishing the pending title suits without providing an alternative remedy was valid.
Whether the Presidential Reference should be answered.

Religious property is not generally immune from the State’s power of acquisition.
Article 25 protects the practice of religion, not an absolute right to possess every property at which worship has occurred.
A particular place receives stronger protection where worship at that exact location is itself essential and inseparable from the religion.
Secularism requires the State to maintain principled neutrality among religions.
The State cannot acquire religious property in a discriminatory manner intended to favour or suppress a particular community.
The rule of law requires a fair mechanism for resolving existing claims.

The majority held that acquisition of the disputed and surrounding area was intended to control a serious communal dispute and facilitate an orderly resolution.
Acquisition by itself did not decide whether Hindus or Muslims owned the disputed land.
The Government was constitutionally required to preserve the property until title was lawfully determined.
The Court observed that a mosque, like other religious property, could be acquired where acquisition did not prevent the practice of Islam altogether.
The statement that a mosque was not essential for every Islamic prayer was made in the context of the State’s acquisition power, not as permission for religious discrimination.
Section 4(3), however, created a serious constitutional defect.
It terminated the pending title suits without deciding ownership and without providing another judicial mechanism.
This placed the Government in possession while leaving the competing parties without an effective remedy.
The provision was therefore struck down.
Once the title suits revived, the Court considered the Presidential Reference unnecessary and returned it unanswered.
Justices Bharucha and Ahmadi dissented more broadly, viewing the acquisition and reference as insufficiently neutral and inconsistent with secularism.

By a 3:2 majority, most of the Acquisition Act was upheld.
Religious property, including a mosque, was not completely immune from acquisition.
Section 4(3), which extinguished the pending suits without an alternative remedy, was invalid.