Constitutional Law

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala

AIR 1973 SC 1461; (1973) 4 SCC 225

Citation: AIR 1973 SC 1461; (1973) 4 SCC 225
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 24 April 1973
Bench: S.M. Sikri C.J.; J.M. Shelat; K.S. Hegde; A.N. Grover; A.N. Ray; P. Jaganmohan Reddy; D.G. Palekar; H.R. Khanna; K.K. Mathew; M.H. Beg; S.N. Dwivedi; A.K. Mukherjea; Y.V. Chandrachud

Facts

Kesavananda Bharati was the head of the Edneer Mutt in Kerala.
Kerala land-reform legislation restricted the Mutt’s ownership and management of property.
He challenged the laws under several fundamental rights.
During the proceedings, Parliament enacted:
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, affirming Parliament’s power to amend every constitutional provision;
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, limiting property rights and introducing Article 31C; and
the Twenty-Ninth Amendment, placing Kerala land-reform laws in the Ninth Schedule.
The case consequently became a broader challenge to the nature and limits of Parliament’s constitutional amendment power.
A thirteen-judge Bench—the largest in Supreme Court history—heard the matter.

Whether Parliament may amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights.
Whether the amending power under Article 368 is unlimited.
Whether the Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth and Twenty-Ninth Amendments were valid.
Whether there are basic constitutional features that Parliament cannot destroy.

Parliament possesses wide constituent power under Article 368.
It may amend every part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights.
However, the word “amendment” does not include destruction or alteration of the Constitution’s essential identity.
Parliament cannot damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.
Basic structure is not an exhaustive fixed list.
Features identified across the opinions included:
supremacy of the Constitution;
republican and democratic government;
secularism;
federalism;
separation of powers;
judicial review;
rule of law; and
individual freedom and dignity.

The Court rejected Golak Nath’s conclusion that Parliament could never amend fundamental rights.
A Constitution must remain capable of adapting to political and social change.
Article 368 therefore provides substantive constituent power and not merely an amendment procedure.
However, unlimited power would allow Parliament to:
abolish elections;
eliminate judicial review;
establish dictatorship; or
destroy federalism while retaining the constitutional label.
Such changes would not genuinely “amend” the Constitution; they would replace it.
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was upheld because it confirmed Parliament’s power to amend all constitutional provisions and required presidential assent.
The first part of Article 31C, protecting laws implementing Article 39(b) and (c), was substantially upheld.
The portion seeking completely to exclude judicial review of whether a law genuinely pursued those Directive Principles was rejected.
The Twenty-Ninth Amendment was not treated as giving Parliament permission to destroy the basic structure merely by placing laws in the Ninth Schedule.
Justice H.R. Khanna’s decisive position created the narrow majority:
Parliament could amend fundamental rights;
but it could not alter the Constitution’s basic structure.
The judges did not produce one common exhaustive definition, meaning the doctrine developed through later cases.

By a 7:6 majority, the Court established the basic-structure doctrine.
Parliament may amend every provision of the Constitution, including Part III.
It may not damage or destroy the Constitution’s essential identity.
Golak Nath was overruled insofar as it completely prohibited amendment of fundamental rights.
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was upheld.