Judgement Briefs

Constitutional Law

Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay

AIR 1951 SC 128

Citation
AIR 1951 SC 128
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
22 January 1951
Bench
H.J. Kania C.J.; S. Fazl Ali; M. Patanjali Sastri; Mehr Chand Mahajan; Sudhi Ranjan Das; N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar; B.K. Mukherjea

Facts

  • Keshavan Madhava Menon was the secretary of the People’s Publishing House Ltd., Bombay.
  • In September 1949, he published an Urdu pamphlet titled Railway Mazdoorun Ke Khilaf Nai Sazish.
  • He was arrested on 9 December 1949 and prosecuted under Sections 15 and 18 of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931.
  • The prosecution alleged that the pamphlet was an unauthorised “news-sheet” whose publication constituted an offence under the Act.
  • While the prosecution was still pending, the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950.
  • Menon argued that the relevant provisions of the 1931 Act were inconsistent with the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
  • He maintained that Article 13(1) made those provisions void and, consequently, the pending prosecution could no longer continue.
  • The Bombay High Court rejected his argument, following which he appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue

  • Whether Article 13(1) operates retrospectively upon acts committed before the Constitution came into force.
  • Whether a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with fundamental rights becomes void from the date of its original enactment.
  • Whether a prosecution initiated before 26 January 1950 could continue after the Constitution commenced.

Rule

  • Article 13(1) provides that pre-Constitution laws shall be void only to the extent of their inconsistency with fundamental rights.
  • The provision is prospective and does not retrospectively invalidate acts lawfully done before the Constitution.
  • A pre-Constitution law inconsistent with Part III is not void ab initio.
  • Such a law becomes ineffective only regarding the future exercise of fundamental rights after 26 January 1950.
  • The effect of Article 13(1) is different from the complete repeal or expiry of a statute.

Application

  • The Court observed that the pamphlet had been published and the prosecution had begun before the Constitution came into force.
  • At the time of publication, the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act was legally valid and enforceable.
  • Menon did not possess the constitutional right under Article 19(1)(a) when the alleged offence was committed because Part III had not yet commenced.
  • Treating the Act as though it had always been void would give Article 13(1) retrospective effect.
  • The language of Article 13(1) did not support such retrospectivity.
  • The words “shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void” meant that the law became ineffective only from the commencement of the Constitution and only where it obstructed the exercise of a fundamental right.
  • The law continued to exist for:
  • transactions completed before the Constitution;
  • rights and liabilities arising before the Constitution;
  • offences committed before the Constitution; and
  • persons who could not claim the particular fundamental right.
  • The majority therefore rejected the contention that the Constitution erased every legal consequence arising under an inconsistent pre-Constitution law.
  • The Court also distinguished Article 13 invalidity from the expiry of a temporary law. A temporary law may completely cease to operate when its period ends, but Article 13 merely makes an inconsistent law inoperative within the area occupied by fundamental rights.
  • Fazl Ali and Mukherjea JJ. dissented. They agreed that Article 13 was not retrospective regarding completed transactions but considered that an inconsistent law should not continue to be applied in pending and incomplete proceedings after the Constitution had commenced.

Conclusion

  • By a 5:2 majority, the Supreme Court held that Article 13(1) does not make inconsistent pre-Constitution laws void from their inception.
  • It only renders them ineffective, to the extent of inconsistency, regarding the exercise of fundamental rights after 26 January 1950.
  • The alleged offence had been committed when the 1931 Act was fully valid.
  • The pending prosecution could therefore continue even after the commencement of the Constitution.