Constitutional Law

M. Nagaraj v. Union of India

(2006) 8 SCC 212; AIR 2007 SC 71

Citation: (2006) 8 SCC 212; AIR 2007 SC 71
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 19 October 2006
Bench: Y.K. Sabharwal C.J.; K.G. Balakrishnan; S.H. Kapadia; C.K. Thakker; P.K. Balasubramanyan

Facts

Earlier judgments had placed constitutional restrictions upon reservations in promotion for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Parliament responded through several constitutional amendments:
the Seventy-Seventh Amendment inserted Article 16(4A), permitting reservation in promotion;
the Eighty-First Amendment inserted Article 16(4B), addressing backlog vacancies;
the Eighty-Second Amendment added a proviso to Article 335 permitting relaxation in qualifying standards; and
the Eighty-Fifth Amendment permitted consequential seniority for promoted SC/ST employees.
The amendments were challenged as violating:
equality;
efficiency in administration;
the fifty per cent ceiling; and
the basic structure.
The petitioners argued that Parliament had constitutionally removed safeguards previously recognised by the Supreme Court.

Whether the reservation amendments damaged the equality code forming part of the basic structure.
Whether Parliament had altered the identity of Articles 14 and 16.
Whether reservation in promotion became mandatory.
What constitutional conditions a State must satisfy before using Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B).

Equality is part of the basic structure, but every modification of equality doctrine does not destroy that structure.
A constitutional amendment may be tested through:
the width test, examining the extent of the power created; and
the identity test, examining whether the amendment alters the Constitution’s essential identity.
Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) are enabling provisions.
They permit but do not compel reservation in promotion.
Before granting such reservation, the State must establish constitutionally relevant conditions through quantifiable material.
The State must consider:
backwardness;
inadequacy of representation; and
maintenance of administrative efficiency under Article 335.
Reservation cannot become excessive, indefinite or a mechanism for destroying equality.

The Court held that the amendments did not eliminate Articles 14, 16 or 335.
They created an additional constitutional power but left the State free to decide whether reservation in promotion was required.
The amendments therefore did not automatically reserve any post or promote any individual.
Their operation depended upon future State action, which remained open to judicial review.
The equality code continued to impose structural limitations.
The Court identified safeguards including:
the fifty per cent ceiling;
consideration of creamy-layer exclusion;
avoidance of indefinite reservation;
demonstration of inadequate representation; and
preservation of administrative efficiency.
Because these limitations continued to operate, Parliament had not destroyed constitutional equality.
The amendments merely restored flexibility to the political branches after earlier judicial decisions.
A State could not rely upon the amendments as a blanket justification.
It had to examine the particular service or cadre and establish a factual basis for promotional reservation.
The Court therefore distinguished between:
validity of the constitutional amendments; and
validity of a specific reservation policy made under them.
The former survived basic-structure review, while the latter would depend upon supporting data and constitutional proportionality.

The five-judge Bench unanimously upheld the Seventy-Seventh, Eighty-First, Eighty-Second and Eighty-Fifth Amendments.
They did not damage the basic structure because they were enabling rather than compulsory.
Equality remained constitutionally controlling.
States seeking to provide reservation in promotion had to justify the measure through relevant material and respect constitutional limitations.