Constitutional Law

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India

AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248

Citation: AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 25 January 1978
Bench: M.H. Beg C.J.; Y.V. Chandrachud; V.R. Krishna Iyer; P.N. Bhagwati; N.L. Untwalia; S. Murtaza Fazal Ali; P.S. Kailasam

Facts

Maneka Gandhi held a passport issued under the Passports Act, 1967.
The Regional Passport Officer directed her to surrender it because the Central Government had decided to impound it “in the public interest.”
No prior hearing was given.
When she requested reasons, the Government initially refused to disclose them, claiming that disclosure was against public interest.
She approached the Supreme Court under Article 32.
She argued that the impounding order violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 because:
it was arbitrary;
it restricted her ability to travel abroad; and
it followed no fair hearing.
During the proceedings, the Government offered her an opportunity to make a representation.

Whether the right to travel abroad forms part of “personal liberty” under Article 21.
Whether procedure under Article 21 must be fair, just and reasonable.
Whether Articles 14, 19 and 21 must be read together.
Whether natural justice required a hearing before or after impounding a passport.

Personal liberty under Article 21 has a wide meaning and includes the right to travel abroad.
A procedure depriving a person of liberty cannot be arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.
It must be:
right;
just;
fair; and
reasonable.
Articles 14, 19 and 21 are interconnected.
A law affecting personal liberty must satisfy:
Article 21’s fair-procedure requirement;
Article 14’s prohibition of arbitrariness; and
any applicable freedom and restriction under Article 19.
Natural justice ordinarily forms part of fair procedure unless validly excluded by urgent circumstances.

The Court rejected the isolated-rights approach associated with A.K. Gopalan.
Deprivation of liberty could simultaneously affect several fundamental rights.
The existence of a formally enacted law was no longer sufficient.
The law and its procedure had to meet substantive standards of fairness and non-arbitrariness.
Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act permitted impounding in the public interest.
The Court did not strike down the provision because it could be interpreted consistently with constitutional fairness.
Although the Act did not expressly require a prior hearing, natural justice could be read into it.
In urgent circumstances, the Government might impound first, but it must provide a prompt post-decisional hearing.
Refusal to disclose reasons could be justified only where the authority properly concluded that disclosure itself harmed public interest.
The Government’s offer to hear Maneka Gandhi prevented the order from being invalidated without giving the authority an opportunity to reconsider.
The Court also emphasised that administrative convenience could not replace constitutional fairness.

The Court held that the right to travel abroad is part of personal liberty under Article 21.
Procedure depriving liberty must be fair, just and reasonable.
Articles 14, 19 and 21 must be read together rather than as separate compartments.
The Passports Act was upheld only on the understanding that fair hearing requirements applied.