Constitutional Law

Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India

AIR 1980 SC 1789; (1980) 3 SCC 625

Citation: AIR 1980 SC 1789; (1980) 3 SCC 625
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 31 July 1980
Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud C.J.; P.N. Bhagwati; A.C. Gupta; N.L. Untwalia; P.S. Kailasam

Facts

Minerva Mills was a textile undertaking taken over by the Central Government under nationalisation legislation.
During the challenge to the takeover, the petitioners also questioned important parts of the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976.
Section 4 of the Amendment expanded Article 31C.
It protected every law implementing any Directive Principle from challenge under Articles 14 and 19.
Previously, Article 31C primarily protected laws implementing Article 39(b) and (c).
Section 55 inserted clauses (4) and (5) into Article 368.
These clauses:
excluded judicial review of constitutional amendments; and
declared that Parliament’s amendment power had no limitation.
A five-judge Bench considered whether Parliament could enlarge its own power beyond the limits recognised in Kesavananda Bharati.

Whether Parliament could declare its amendment power unlimited.
Whether judicial review of constitutional amendments could be completely excluded.
Whether all Directive Principles could receive absolute priority over Articles 14 and 19.
Whether harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles forms part of the basic structure.

Limited amendment power is itself part of the basic structure.
Parliament cannot convert a limited constitutional power into an unlimited one.
Judicial review is an essential constitutional feature.
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are complementary constitutional commitments.
Neither Part III nor Part IV possesses absolute superiority over the other.
Harmony and balance between them form part of the Constitution’s basic structure.
A constitutional amendment cannot destroy Fundamental Rights merely by stating that the legislation implements a Directive Principle.

Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 attempted to make Parliament the final judge of the scope of its own constituent power.
If judicial review were excluded, there would be no independent constitutional authority capable of determining whether Parliament had destroyed:
democracy;
federalism;
judicial independence; or
other basic features.
Parliament derives its amendment power from the Constitution and cannot enlarge that power beyond the source from which it arises.
The declaration of unlimited amendment power was therefore self-defeating and unconstitutional.
The expanded Article 31C also created an impermissible imbalance.
Directive Principles seek social and economic justice, while Fundamental Rights protect freedom, equality and dignity.
The Constitution requires both sets of commitments to work together.
Giving every Directive Principle automatic superiority over Articles 14 and 19 could permit broad destruction of equality and liberty.
A legislature could merely claim that a law promoted some Directive Principle and thereby avoid ordinary rights review.
The Court did not treat Directive Principles as inferior.
It held that their implementation must occur through constitutional means and without eliminating the basic guarantees of Part III.
Justice Bhagwati agreed that unlimited amendment power and exclusion of judicial review were invalid, though his approach to Article 31C differed from the majority.

By a 4:1 majority, Section 4 of the Forty-Second Amendment, which expanded Article 31C to all Directive Principles, was struck down.
Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 were also declared unconstitutional.
Limited amending power and judicial review were reaffirmed as basic structural features.