Constitutional Law

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation

AIR 1986 SC 180; (1985) 3 SCC 545

Citation: AIR 1986 SC 180; (1985) 3 SCC 545
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 10 July 1985
Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud C.J.; V.D. Tulzapurkar; O. Chinnappa Reddy; S. Murtaza Fazal Ali; V. Khalid

Facts

Large numbers of pavement and slum dwellers lived close to their places of work in Bombay.
The Municipal Corporation proposed to remove their structures as unauthorised obstructions under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act.
The petitioners argued that eviction would force them away from employment and therefore destroy their livelihoods.
Many had previously given undertakings that they would not claim a legal right to remain on pavements.
They challenged eviction under Articles 14, 19 and 21.
The Corporation argued that:
pavements existed for pedestrians;
their occupation was unlawful;
encroachments created sanitation and traffic problems; and
no fundamental right permitted occupation of public pathways.

Whether the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood.
Whether pavement dwellers possessed a fundamental right to occupy public pavements.
Whether eviction without prior notice violated fair procedure.
Whether earlier undertakings prevented the petitioners from asserting fundamental rights.

The right to life includes the right to livelihood because a person cannot ordinarily live without the means of living.
Depriving livelihood therefore attracts Article 21.
The right to livelihood does not create a right to carry on an occupation at every place chosen by the individual.
Deprivation may occur through a fair, just and reasonable procedure established by law.
Fundamental rights cannot be defeated through estoppel or an earlier undertaking.
Even where a statute permits action without notice, fairness may require an opportunity to be heard unless urgency justifies immediate action.

The Court accepted the factual relationship between residence and employment.
Pavement dwellers lived near workplaces because distant housing and transport were unaffordable.
Removing them could result in loss of employment.
Their eviction therefore affected livelihood and consequently Article 21.
However, recognising livelihood as part of life did not convert unlawful pavement occupation into a fundamental right.
Pavements are public property intended primarily for pedestrian movement.
The Corporation had a legal duty to keep them free from obstruction.
Section 314 permitted removal without notice, but the power had to be exercised fairly and reasonably.
The petitioners had received a complete hearing before the Supreme Court.
Therefore, requiring the Corporation to repeat an identical hearing before eviction would serve no practical purpose in this case.
The Court also rejected the argument that the petitioners had waived their constitutional claim through earlier undertakings.
There can be no estoppel against enforcement of fundamental rights.
The Court balanced livelihood and public use by delaying demolition and recording governmental rehabilitation assurances for eligible residents.

The Supreme Court held that the right to livelihood forms part of Article 21.
Pavement dwellers nevertheless had no fundamental right to occupy public pavements permanently.
Eviction under valid municipal law was constitutionally permissible if conducted through fair procedure.
Since the petitioners had already been fully heard, further individual notices were not required on the facts.