Constitutional Law

Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India

AIR 2006 SC 980; (2006) 2 SCC 1

Citation: AIR 2006 SC 980; (2006) 2 SCC 1
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 24 January 2006
Bench: Y.K. Sabharwal C.J.; K.G. Balakrishnan; B.N. Agrawal; Ashok Bhan; Arijit Pasayat

Facts

Bihar’s 2005 Assembly election produced a hung House.
No political party or alliance initially demonstrated a clear majority.
President’s Rule was imposed, and the Assembly was kept in suspended animation without meeting.
Political parties later attempted to form alliances and gather sufficient support to establish a Government.
The Governor sent reports alleging that:
attempts were being made to purchase legislators;
defections were being engineered; and
an unprincipled majority might be created.
Acting upon those reports, the Union Council of Ministers recommended dissolution of the Assembly before it had held its first meeting.
Fresh elections were announced.
Rameshwar Prasad and other elected legislators challenged the dissolution.

Whether Article 356 could be used to dissolve an Assembly merely to prevent a political alliance from attempting to form a Government.
Whether allegations of horse-trading were supported by relevant material.
Whether the Governor could assess the legitimacy of a proposed majority without a floor test.
Whether the Court could restore the dissolved Assembly.
Whether presidential action based on a Governor’s report was judicially reviewable.

The Governor must act as a constitutional authority, not as a political opponent of a possible Government.
A claim to majority should ordinarily be tested on the floor of the House.
Article 356 cannot be used to prevent the constitutional political process merely because the Governor suspects that negotiations are unethical.
Presidential satisfaction is reviewable for:
irrelevant material;
mala fides;
irrationality; and
absence of a constitutional basis.
The Governor’s report is not conclusive merely because the President acted upon it.
The Court may declare dissolution unconstitutional but retains discretion over restorative relief where later events make restoration impracticable.

The Court found that the Governor’s reports rested mainly upon suspicion and unverified political information.
No party had yet been invited to demonstrate majority support.
No vote had taken place in the Assembly.
The Governor effectively assumed that any emerging majority would necessarily be obtained through corruption or improper inducement.
The Constitution does not authorise a Governor to prevent formation of a Government on such speculation.
Political alliances, changes in support and coalition negotiations are not themselves unconstitutional.
If an allegedly improper Government is formed, its majority must be examined on the House floor.
Individual acts of bribery or defection may be addressed through:
criminal law;
the Tenth Schedule; or
other legal mechanisms.
Dissolving the Assembly before it met denied elected representatives the opportunity to perform their constitutional role.
The Governor’s reports were therefore tainted and constitutionally insufficient.
However, by the time final relief was considered:
the election process for a new Assembly had substantially advanced; and
restoring the old House would create severe uncertainty.
The majority therefore declined to revive the dissolved Assembly despite declaring the action unconstitutional.

By a 3:2 majority, the dissolution of the Bihar Assembly was declared unconstitutional.
The Governor’s reports contained no adequate material justifying Article 356.
A speculative fear of horse-trading could not replace a floor test.