Constitutional Law

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras

AIR 1950 SC 124

Citation: AIR 1950 SC 124
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 26 May 1950
Bench: H.J. Kania C.J.; S. Fazl Ali; M. Patanjali Sastri; Mehr Chand Mahajan; B.K. Mukherjea; Sudhi Ranjan Das

Facts

Romesh Thappar was the printer, publisher and editor of Cross Roads, an English weekly journal published in Bombay.
The journal frequently contained political commentary and criticism of governmental policies.
The Government of Madras issued an order under Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949.
The order prohibited the entry, circulation, sale and distribution of Cross Roads throughout the State of Madras.
The Government stated that the prohibition was necessary for:
securing public safety; and
maintaining public order.
Thappar directly approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, arguing that the prohibition violated his freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
At that time, the original Article 19(2) permitted restrictions connected with the security of the State, but “public order” was not yet an independent ground of restriction.

Whether freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom to circulate a newspaper.
Whether a restriction imposed for maintaining general public order was protected by the original Article 19(2).
Whether Section 9(1-A), which authorised restrictions on broad public-order grounds, was void under Article 13.

Freedom of speech and expression includes:
publication of ideas;
propagation of ideas; and
freedom of circulation.
A restriction on circulation directly restricts freedom of expression because publication becomes meaningless if the material cannot reach its readers.
Under the original Article 19(2), speech could be restricted only where the law related to matters undermining the security of the State or tending to overthrow it.
Ordinary breaches of public order were constitutionally different from serious threats to the security of the State.
A law extending beyond the grounds permitted by Article 19(2) is void under Article 13.

The Court held that the ban did not merely regulate the physical movement of the journal.
By preventing the journal from reaching readers in Madras, the order directly restricted Thappar’s ability to communicate political ideas.
The freedom of circulation was therefore an essential part of Article 19(1)(a).
The State argued that “public safety” and “public order” were sufficiently connected with the security of the State.
The majority rejected this broad interpretation.
It distinguished between:
local or ordinary disturbances of public tranquillity; and
serious disorders threatening the State’s security or existence.
The original Article 19(2) protected laws addressing only the latter category.
Section 9(1-A), however, authorised the Government to prohibit publications for the wider purpose of maintaining general public order.
It could therefore be used even where the publication created no danger to the security of the State.
Because the statutory power extended beyond the constitutionally permitted ground, the restriction could not be saved by Article 19(2).
Kania C.J. dissented. He considered that public safety could be interpreted sufficiently narrowly to connect it with State security.
The majority, however, refused to read the broad statutory language in that restricted manner.

The Supreme Court held that the freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom of circulation.
Section 9(1-A), insofar as it authorised restrictions merely for maintaining public order, exceeded the original Article 19(2).
The provision was unconstitutional under Article 13.
The Madras Government’s order prohibiting the circulation of Cross Roads was quashed.