Constitutional Law

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

AIR 2015 SC 1523; (2015) 5 SCC 1

Facts

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 criminalised sending online information that was:
grossly offensive;
menacing;
annoying;
inconvenient;
insulting; or
sent with ill will.
Several individuals had been arrested for social-media posts criticising political leaders or expressing unpopular views.
Shreya Singhal and other petitioners challenged Section 66A under Articles 14 and 19(1)(a).
They also challenged:
Section 69A, which authorised blocking of online information;
Section 79, concerning intermediary liability; and
parts of the Intermediary Guidelines Rules.
The Government argued that online communication had a wide and immediate reach and therefore required stricter regulation.

Whether Section 66A was vague, overbroad and unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(a).
Whether its prohibited expressions fell within any ground under Article 19(2).
Whether Section 69A contained sufficient safeguards.
When an intermediary may be required to remove unlawful content under Section 79.

The Court distinguished three stages of expression:
discussion;
advocacy; and
incitement.
Discussion and advocacy remain protected even when unpopular.
Restriction generally becomes constitutionally permissible only when expression reaches incitement connected with an Article 19(2) ground.
Criminal laws restricting speech must define prohibited conduct with sufficient clarity.
Vague expressions create:
arbitrary enforcement;
overbreadth; and
a chilling effect on lawful speech.
There must be a proximate connection between the prohibited expression and a ground under Article 19(2).

Expressions such as “annoyance,” “inconvenience,” “grossly offensive” and “ill will” had no clear legal meaning.
What annoyed one person might be harmless or valuable political speech to another.
Citizens could not reasonably know what online statements would expose them to imprisonment.
Police officers received no objective standard for distinguishing lawful criticism from criminal conduct.
The provision therefore enabled arbitrary arrests.
Section 66A did not require:
incitement to violence;
disruption of public order;
defamation of an identifiable person; or
any other constitutionally permitted harm.
Its reach extended far beyond Article 19(2).
The Court rejected the Government’s promise that the provision would be applied carefully.
An unconstitutional law cannot be preserved through an assurance of responsible enforcement.
Section 69A was upheld because it contained procedural safeguards, including written reasons, hearing mechanisms and review.
Section 79 was read down.
“Actual knowledge” requiring an intermediary to remove content would arise only through:
a court order; or
a lawful governmental notification connected with Article 19(2).
Private complaints alone could not force intermediaries to decide complex questions of legality.