Constitutional Law

State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu

2025 SCC OnLine SC 770; 2025 INSC 481

Facts

The Tamil Nadu Legislature passed several Bills, many relating to the appointment of Vice-Chancellors and the administration of State universities.
Twelve Bills remained pending before the Governor for prolonged periods, with some dating from 2020.
After the Supreme Court began hearing the dispute, the Governor declared that he was withholding assent from ten Bills.
He did not return them with a detailed message for reconsideration.
The Legislative Assembly nevertheless reconsidered and repassed the ten Bills in their original form on 18 November 2023.
When they were presented again, the Governor reserved them for the President’s consideration.
The President later withheld assent from some of them.
Tamil Nadu challenged:
the prolonged delay;
the method of withholding assent;
reservation of the repassed Bills; and
the President’s consequential action.

Whether Article 200 permits the Governor to keep Bills pending indefinitely.
Whether withholding assent must be accompanied by returning a non-Money Bill to the Legislature.
Whether a repassed Bill may subsequently be reserved for the President.
Whether the Governor’s action or inaction is judicially reviewable.
Whether courts may prescribe reasonable timelines and grant relief under Article 142.

Article 200 does not recognise a “pocket veto.”
The Governor must exercise one of the constitutionally available options:
assent;
withhold assent and return a non-Money Bill with a message; or
reserve the Bill for the President.
The substantive power to withhold assent must be read with the first proviso requiring reconsideration.
Where the Legislature repasses a returned Bill, the Governor ordinarily must assent.
The Governor generally functions within the parliamentary system and cannot use Article 200 to defeat the elected Legislature.
Prolonged and unexplained inaction is subject to judicial review.

The Court found that the Governor had kept the Bills pending for an excessive period without constitutionally completing the assent process.
Merely stating that assent was withheld, without properly returning the Bills for reconsideration, did not satisfy Article 200’s democratic procedure.
The Assembly nevertheless reconsidered and repassed the Bills.
At that stage, the Governor attempted to reserve them for the President.
The Court held that such second-stage reservation was ordinarily unavailable.
Permitting it would allow the Governor to avoid the constitutional consequence of legislative reconsideration.
The Governor’s conduct was found to lack bona fides and to disregard earlier judicial clarification.
Reservation of the ten repassed Bills was declared illegal.
Since the President’s later decisions depended upon that invalid reservation, those actions were also set aside.
The Court prescribed benchmark periods for action by Governors and the President, treating them as standards for reviewing delay.
In the exceptional circumstances, it exercised Article 142 and declared the ten Bills deemed assented to from 18 November 2023.

The Governor’s reservation of the ten repassed Bills was set aside.
The President’s consequential action was also declared non-existent.
The ten Bills were deemed to have received the Governor’s assent on 18 November 2023.
The Court rejected indefinite gubernatorial inaction and attempted to establish enforceable constitutional discipline for assent decisions.
Important subsequent constitutional position
On 20 November 2025, a five-judge Bench answering a Presidential Reference substantially qualified this ruling.
It held that:
courts cannot prescribe universal fixed timelines under Articles 200 and 201;
the Governor has discretion among the three Article 200 options and is not bound by ministerial advice in making that choice;
the merits of the Governor’s assent decision are generally not justiciable before a Bill becomes law;
courts may issue a limited direction where inaction is prolonged and indefinite; and