Constitutional Law

Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh

(1993) 1 SCC 645

Citation: (1993) 1 SCC 645
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 4 February 1993
Bench: L.M. Sharma C.J.; S. Ratnavel Pandian; S. Mohan; B.P. Jeevan Reddy; S.P. Bharucha

Facts

Several States enacted laws regulating admissions and fees in private professional colleges.
The measures sought to prevent:
capitation fees;
commercialisation of education;
arbitrary admissions; and
exclusion of meritorious students unable to pay high fees.
Private medical and engineering colleges challenged these restrictions.
They argued that establishing and administering educational institutions formed part of their rights under Article 19(1)(g).
The case also required reconsideration of Mohini Jain, which had broadly declared a fundamental right to education at all levels.
The Court had to balance:
access to education;
institutional autonomy;
State regulation; and
the financial realities of professional education.

Whether the right to education is included in Article 21.
Whether the State must provide free education at every level.
Whether education is a trade or business protected from regulation.
Whether private professional colleges may charge capitation fees or make admissions solely according to financial capacity.
What regulatory structure could constitutionally govern admissions and fees.

The right to education flows from Article 21 when read with Articles 41, 45 and 46.
Every child has a fundamental right to free education until the age of fourteen.
Beyond fourteen years, the State’s obligation depends upon:
its economic capacity; and
level of development.
Education is a constitutionally important activity and cannot be treated as an ordinary commercial business.
Private institutions may operate, but the State may regulate admissions and fees to prevent:
profiteering;
capitation fees; and
unfair exclusion.

The Court rejected the unlimited formulation in Mohini Jain that the State must provide free education at every level regardless of resources.
Article 45 specifically directed free and compulsory education for children up to fourteen years.
Reading Article 21 with Article 45 made that obligation judicially enforceable.
For higher and professional education, Article 41 expressly referred to the State’s economic capacity.
The Court therefore drew a constitutional distinction between elementary and advanced education.
It also held that educational institutions could not sell admission as a commercial commodity.
Capitation fees made access depend upon wealth rather than merit and equality.
To reconcile private participation with public responsibility, the Court devised an admission and fee scheme.
Broadly, it divided seats into:
merit-based “free seats”; and
regulated “payment seats.”
Admissions were to be made through a common process, and fees were to be controlled by public authorities.
The scheme attempted to allow institutions to recover reasonable costs without permitting profiteering.
The judicially created admission scheme was later displaced in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, but the recognition of elementary education as a fundamental right became constitutionally significant and preceded Article 21A.

The majority held that the right to education is implicit in Article 21.
Free education up to fourteen years was declared a fundamental right.
Education beyond that stage was subject to the State’s economic capacity and development.
Capitation fees and unrestricted commercialisation were rejected.