Judgement Briefs

Contract Law

Mills v. Wyman

3 Pick 207 (Mass. 1825)

Citation
3 Pick 207 (Mass. 1825)
Court
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Date
1825
Bench
Chief Justice Parker

Facts

  • Wyman’s adult son became seriously ill while away from his family.
  • Mills voluntarily took care of him during the illness.
  • Mills provided shelter, nursing and necessary expenses.
  • The son eventually died.
  • Wyman, the father, later learned of the assistance given by Mills.
  • He wrote to Mills and promised to reimburse him for the expenses.
  • Wyman later refused to pay.
  • Mills sued to enforce the father’s promise.
  • There was no evidence that:
  • the father had requested the services beforehand;
  • Mills had acted on the father’s instructions; or
  • the father was legally responsible for supporting his adult son.

Issue

  • Whether a promise made after a benefit has already been voluntarily conferred is supported by consideration.
  • Whether a moral obligation alone can make a later promise legally enforceable.

Rule

  • Consideration must ordinarily be given in exchange for the promise.
  • Past voluntary conduct is not good consideration where it was not performed:
  • at the promisor’s request; or
  • in reliance on the promisor’s promise.
  • A purely moral obligation is generally insufficient to create contractual liability.
  • A later promise based only on gratitude does not become enforceable unless it falls within a recognised legal exception.

Application

  • Mills had acted generously and had provided real assistance to Wyman’s son.
  • However, the legal question was not whether Mills deserved compensation morally.
  • The question was whether there was a bargain between Mills and Wyman.
  • At the time the services were provided:
  • Wyman had not asked Mills to act;
  • Wyman had made no promise of payment;
  • Mills was not acting in exchange for any undertaking by Wyman.
  • The services were therefore completed before Wyman’s promise arose.
  • The later promise could not retrospectively convert those voluntary services into contractual consideration.
  • The Court accepted that the father may have felt a strong moral duty to reimburse Mills.
  • But moral duty and legal duty are not identical.
  • The son was an adult, and the father was not legally liable for the debts or maintenance of an adult child merely because of the family relationship.
  • The Court distinguished cases where a new promise may revive an earlier legal obligation, such as:
  • a debt barred by limitation;
  • a promise made after infancy;
  • certain obligations previously unenforceable because of technical rules.
  • In those situations, an earlier legal obligation exists even though the remedy is defective.
  • Here, however, there had never been any legal obligation on the father.
  • The promise rested only on moral gratitude and past voluntary conduct.
  • Therefore, there was no consideration.

Conclusion

  • The Court held that Wyman’s promise was unenforceable.
  • Mills’ services were past and voluntary and had not been performed at Wyman’s request.
  • A moral obligation alone did not constitute legal consideration.
  • Use this case for: past voluntary consideration and moral obligation do not ordinarily support a subsequent promise.