Contract Law

Tweddle v. Atkinson

(1861) 1 B & S 393

Facts

William Guy and John Tweddle were the fathers of a bride and groom.
They entered into a written agreement concerning financial provision for their children’s marriage.
Guy promised to pay a sum of money to his daughter.
Tweddle promised to pay another sum to his son, William Tweddle.
The agreement expressly stated that the groom, William Tweddle, would have the right to sue for the promised amounts.
The fathers had made the agreement with each other.
The groom was not himself a party to it and had supplied no consideration.
One of the fathers died before making the promised payment.
William Tweddle sued the executor of the deceased father’s estate.
He argued that the agreement was intended for his benefit and expressly gave him a right to enforce it.

Whether a person who is not a party to a contract can enforce a promise made for his benefit.
Whether consideration supplied by another person is enough under English common law.

Under the traditional doctrine of privity of contract, only a person who is a party to the contract can sue upon it.
A third-party beneficiary cannot ordinarily enforce a promise merely because the contract was intended to benefit them.
Under traditional English law, consideration must move from the person seeking to enforce the promise.
A contract between A and B cannot normally be enforced by C, even where:
C is named;
the contract benefits C;
A and B intended C to receive the benefit.

The court accepted that the agreement was plainly intended to benefit William Tweddle.
It also accepted that the written agreement purported to give him a right to sue.
However, the fathers were the actual contracting parties.
William Tweddle:
made no promise;
paid no money;
undertook no obligation;
supplied no consideration.
Therefore, he was a stranger both to the contract and to the consideration.
The court treated these as decisive legal barriers.
The intention of the original parties could not by itself give an outsider an enforceable contractual right under the common law doctrine then applicable.
The consideration supplied by his father could not be treated as consideration moving from William.
The result appears strict because William was the intended beneficiary.
Nevertheless, the court applied the principle that contractual rights and liabilities arise only between those who participate in the bargain.
The case became a leading authority for two connected propositions:
privity of contract; and
the English rule that consideration must move from the promisee.
The case is now subject to statutory exceptions in England, particularly under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, but it remains historically important.

The court held that William Tweddle could not enforce the agreement.
He was not a party to the contract and had provided no consideration.
His claim was dismissed.
Use this case for: a third-party beneficiary cannot enforce a contract under the traditional doctrine of privity.