Criminal Law

Amjad Khan v. State

AIR 1952 SC 165

Facts

The incident occurred during serious communal violence.
A violent mob had gathered in the area.
The mob attacked and looted a nearby shop belonging to the accused’s brother.
Members of the mob then moved toward Amjad Khan’s premises.
Women and children were present inside his house or shop.
The mob beat upon the doors and created an immediate threat of entry.
Amjad Khan fired two shots at the advancing crowd.
One person was killed and several others were injured.
Amjad Khan was prosecuted for offences arising from the shooting.
He claimed that he acted in private defence of:
his own body;
the women and children inside;
his home and property.
The prosecution argued that lethal force was unnecessary because the mob had not yet entered the premises.

Whether the right of private defence had begun before the mob physically entered the premises.
Whether the circumstances created a reasonable apprehension of death, grievous hurt or serious violence.
Whether firing two shots amounted to excessive defensive force.

The right of private defence begins when a reasonable apprehension of the relevant danger arises.
The defender need not wait until:
the first injury is inflicted;
the house is entered;
the threatened offence is completed.
Under Section 100 IPC, the right of defence of the body may extend to causing death where the assault reasonably creates apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
The right must be defensive rather than retaliatory.
The amount of force used should not be clearly excessive.
Courts must assess defensive conduct realistically in the confusion and urgency of the occurrence, not with perfect hindsight.

The danger faced by Amjad Khan was not speculative.
The mob had already demonstrated its violent purpose by attacking and looting his brother’s shop.
It then approached his premises and beat on the doors.
The presence of women and children increased the urgency and seriousness of the threatened harm.
Amjad Khan could reasonably believe that if the mob entered:
persons inside might be killed or seriously injured;
property would be destroyed or looted;
immediate police assistance would not be available.
The law did not require him to wait until the doors were broken and the occupants attacked.
By that stage, defensive action might have been too late.
The firing was connected with stopping the advancing mob.
He discharged only two shots rather than continuing an indiscriminate attack after the danger ended.
The Court acknowledged that, in calmer circumstances, a different defensive method might appear possible.
However, a person facing a violent mob cannot calculate the exact minimum force with precision.
Defensive conduct should not be weighed in “golden scales.”
The previous attack on the neighbouring shop provided objective support for his apprehension.
The shooting was therefore treated as protection against an imminent unlawful aggression, not revenge for earlier violence.

The Supreme Court held that Amjad Khan acted within his right of private defence.
He was not required to wait until the mob entered and actually attacked the occupants.
The two shots did not constitute clearly excessive force in the circumstances.
His conviction was set aside and he was acquitted.
Use this case for: the right of private defence begins with reasonable apprehension of imminent danger, and the defender need not wait for the aggressor’s first physical blow.