Criminal Law

Attorney General for India v. Satish

(2022) 5 SCC 545

Facts

A minor girl was sexually assaulted by an adult accused.
The accused pressed or touched her breast over her clothing with sexual intent.
The Bombay High Court held that the conduct did not amount to “sexual assault” under Section 7 POCSO because there was no direct skin-to-skin contact.
It treated the conduct under a lesser provision.
The “skin-to-skin” interpretation generated appeals before the Supreme Court.
The Attorney General and other appellants argued that such a narrow reading would defeat the child-protection statute.

Whether physical contact under Section 7 POCSO requires direct skin-to-skin touching.
Whether sexual touching through clothing constitutes sexual assault.
How the provision should be interpreted in light of POCSO’s protective purpose.

Section 7 POCSO covers:
touching specified sexual body parts of a child;
making the child touch such parts;
any other act involving physical contact with sexual intent, short of penetration.
“Touch” and “physical contact” are not confined to bare-skin contact.
The controlling mental element is sexual intent.
A child-protection statute must receive an interpretation that:
advances protection;
avoids absurd loopholes;
does not reward offenders for using clothing as an intermediary.
Courts cannot add words such as “skin-to-skin” that Parliament did not enact.

The accused intentionally touched a sexual part of the child’s body.
Clothing did not remove the physical nature of the contact.
A person pressing a child’s breast through fabric is still applying physical force to the child’s body.
The High Court’s approach would create irrational distinctions:
direct touching would be POCSO assault;
identical sexual touching through thin clothing would not.
Such a rule would undermine the statute and produce easy methods of evasion.
The Court examined the structure of Section 7.
The first portion identifies particular body parts.
The broader concluding words capture other physical sexual acts.
Sexual intent distinguishes criminal sexual contact from innocent contact, such as:
medical examination;
caregiving;
accidental touching.
Therefore, breadth in “physical contact” does not criminalise ordinary conduct because the prosecution must still prove sexual intent.
The child’s clothing was legally irrelevant to whether the act violated bodily integrity.
The High Court’s interpretation focused on literal surface contact while ignoring the provision’s object and language.

The Supreme Court rejected the “skin-to-skin” requirement.
It held that sexual touching through clothing constitutes physical contact under Section 7 POCSO where sexual intent is proved.
The relevant conviction under POCSO was restored.
Use this case for: POCSO sexual assault includes contact through clothing; sexual intent, not bare-skin contact, is decisive.