Criminal Law

Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad

AIR 1955 SC 216

Facts

Five persons were prosecuted for murdering Ramchander.
Witnesses stated that the accused jointly attacked him near a riverbank.
Three of the accused—Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia—were armed with axes.
The other accused carried sticks.
The evidence attributed particular blows:
Tukia struck Ramchander on the cheek and possibly the head;
Pandurang struck him on the head;
after Ramchander fell, Bhillia struck him on the neck.
The trial court convicted all five of murder.
The three appellants were sentenced to death.
The prosecution relied on Section 34 to treat each accused as responsible for the complete attack.
Pandurang argued that the evidence did not establish any prior concert or common intention to murder and that he should be liable only for the injury personally caused by him.

Whether the accused shared a common intention to murder.
Whether similar participation in the same assault was sufficient for Section 34.
Whether Pandurang could be convicted of murder where his own injury was not proved to be fatal.

Common intention under Section 34 presupposes:
a meeting of minds;
prearranged or premeditated concert;
participation in furtherance of that shared intention.
The plan may be formed suddenly and need not exist for a long period.
However, it must be proved either directly or through circumstances that necessarily support the inference.
Same intention is not necessarily common intention.
Where common intention is not proved, each accused is liable only for the injury or offence individually caused.
Vicarious murder liability cannot be imposed merely because several accused simultaneously attack the same victim.

The evidence proved that all the accused participated in the assault.
Participation alone, however, did not answer whether they had agreed to murder Ramchander.
No direct evidence established an earlier plan.
The surrounding circumstances did not make common intention the only reasonable inference.
The accused might each have joined the attack with independently formed intentions.
The Court warned that the boundary between similar and common intention may be narrow, but it remains legally important.
Pandurang’s personal act was clearly established:
he struck the victim’s head with an axe;
the injury penetrated the head and was likely to endanger life.
Nevertheless, the prosecution did not prove that Pandurang’s blow caused death.
Without Section 34, he could not be held vicariously responsible for Bhillia’s fatal neck injury.
His own conduct therefore constituted voluntarily causing grievous hurt by a dangerous weapon under Section 326 IPC.
The position of Tukia and Bhillia differed because the evidence supported their individual murder liability.
The Court thus separated each accused’s actual conduct instead of treating group participation as automatically creating common intention.
This individualised approach prevented Section 34 from becoming a substitute for proof.

The Court held that common intention to murder had not been proved against Pandurang.
His murder conviction was set aside and replaced with a conviction under Section 326 IPC.
He was sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.
The murder convictions of Tukia and Bhillia were maintained, but their death sentences were reduced to transportation for life.
Use this case for: similar intentions during a group attack cannot be treated as common intention unless concert or a meeting of minds is proved.