Criminal Law

Reg. v. Govinda

(1876) ILR 1 Bom 342

Facts

Govinda was approximately eighteen years old.
His wife was about fifteen years old.
A domestic quarrel took place between them.
During the quarrel, Govinda knocked or pushed his wife to the ground.
He placed a knee on her chest and struck her with his fist.
The blows caused internal or bodily injuries from which she died.
There was no evidence that Govinda used a weapon or had planned to kill her.
The Sessions Judge considered the offence murder.
The matter came before the Bombay High Court to determine whether the facts satisfied murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Whether Govinda intended to cause an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Whether the injuries were only likely to cause death.
How Section 299 differs from Section 300 “thirdly.”

Culpable homicide under Section 299 includes causing death:
with intention to cause death;
with intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death;
with knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.
Murder under Section 300 thirdly requires:
intention to cause the particular bodily injury; and
that injury being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
“Likely to cause death” denotes a lower degree of probability.
“Sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” requires a higher and more certain degree of fatality.
The court must examine:
the nature of the injury;
the weapon or force used;
the body part affected;
the surrounding circumstances.

Govinda intentionally assaulted his wife.
He could not claim that all physical contact was accidental.
However, the assault involved fists and bodily force rather than a deadly weapon.
The circumstances did not show a deliberate design to inflict a particular injury ordinarily sufficient to cause death.
The injuries were capable of and likely to produce serious consequences, particularly because of the victim’s age and physical condition.
Yet the evidence did not establish the degree of objective fatal sufficiency required by Section 300 thirdly.
Nor was there proof that Govinda intended death.
The quarrel appeared sudden and domestic rather than a planned homicidal attack.
The Court therefore located the offence within Section 299:
Govinda intended to inflict bodily harm;
the harm was likely to cause death;
but it was not proved to be the particular ordinarily fatal injury contemplated by Section 300.
The judgment explained that Sections 299 and 300 overlap, but Section 300 represents the more aggravated degree of culpable homicide.
The distinction depends on the degree of intention and probability, not merely on the fact that death occurred.

The Bombay High Court held that Govinda committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
The case did not satisfy Section 300 thirdly because the intended injury was not proved sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Use this case for: the classic distinction between bodily injury “likely to cause death” under Section 299 and injury “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” under Section 300 thirdly.