Family Law

Danial Latifi v. Union of India

(2001) 7 SCC 740

Citation: (2001) 7 SCC 740
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 28 September 2001
Bench: Constitution Bench: G.B. Pattanaik, S. Rajendra Babu, D.P. Mohapatra, Doraiswamy Raju and Shivaraj V. Patil, JJ.

Facts

Following the decision in Shah Bano, Parliament enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
Section 3(1)(a) required a former husband to make a “reasonable and fair provision and maintenance” for the divorced woman within the iddat period.
The Act was challenged before a Constitution Bench.
The petitioners argued that:
it removed the broader protection available under Section 125 CrPC;
it confined the husband’s responsibility to a short iddat period;
it discriminated against divorced Muslim women;
it violated Articles 14, 15 and 21.
The Union defended the Act by arguing that it created a separate statutory scheme, including later remedies against relatives and the Wakf Board.

Whether the 1986 Act restricted a Muslim husband’s liability to maintenance only during iddat.
Whether such a restriction would make the Act unconstitutional.
What was meant by “reasonable and fair provision” to be made within iddat.

Statutes should, where reasonably possible, be interpreted in a manner consistent with fundamental rights.
Section 3 distinguishes between:
provision, meaning an arrangement made for the woman’s future; and
maintenance, meaning financial support.
The words “within the iddat period” prescribe the time within which the husband must discharge his obligation.
They do not necessarily limit the period for which the provision must support the woman.
A reasonable and fair provision must consider:
the woman’s future needs;
the standard of life enjoyed during marriage;
the duration of the marriage;
the former husband’s means.
If she remains unable to maintain herself after exhausting that provision, Section 4 permits claims against inheriting relatives and ultimately the Wakf Board.

The Court recognised that reading the Act as ending all responsibility with iddat would place divorced Muslim women in a substantially weaker position than women belonging to other religions.
It would also defeat the constitutional protection against destitution recognised in Shah Bano.
The expression “provision” was therefore given independent meaning.
A man does not make a provision merely by paying daily expenses for three months.
To “provide” means to make an arrangement in advance for future needs.
The husband must calculate and discharge this obligation during iddat, but the amount must be sufficient and fair for the woman’s post-iddat future as well.
Thus:
the payment or arrangement must be completed within iddat;
the benefit and financial coverage may extend beyond iddat.
This interpretation avoided two extreme results:
it did not erase the 1986 Act;
it did not reduce divorced Muslim women to short-term support.
Section 4 was treated as an additional safety mechanism for a woman who remained unable to maintain herself after the provision made by her former husband.
By giving Section 3 this broad meaning, the Court found that the Act continued to provide protection broadly consistent with constitutional equality and dignity.

The constitutional challenge was dismissed, and the 1986 Act was upheld.
A former husband must make a reasonable and fair provision for the divorced woman’s future, including maintenance extending beyond iddat.
That provision must be made or paid within the iddat period.
Where the woman remains unable to maintain herself, she may proceed under Section 4 against relatives and the Wakf Board.
Use this case for: the husband’s liability under the 1986 Act extends beyond iddat, although the provision must be made within iddat.