Family Law

Khuran Sunnath Society v. Union of India

2015 SCC OnLine Ker 13643

Facts

The petition was filed as a public interest litigation by:
the Khuran Sunnath Society;
organisations working for Muslim women;
individual Muslim parents;
other interested persons.
The petitioners challenged the Muslim rules of intestate succession.
They argued that:
a daughter generally receives half the share of a similarly placed son;
where only daughters survive, more distant male relatives may sometimes receive the residue;
a sole son may receive a larger portion than a sole daughter;
these distinctions were based solely on sex.
They sought a declaration that the Muslim inheritance rules recognised through the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 violated:
Articles 14;
15;
19;
21;
They also referred to reforms adopted in several Muslim-majority jurisdictions.

Whether the High Court could, in a PIL under Article 226, declare Muslim inheritance rules unconstitutional and substitute an equal succession regime.
Whether reform of personal-law shares was a judicial or legislative function.

Section 2 of the Shariat Act recognises Muslim Personal Law as the rule of decision for Muslims in matters including:
intestate succession;
marriage;
divorce;
maintenance;
dower;
gifts;
guardianship.
Courts may interpret enacted law and determine concrete legal disputes.
They cannot ordinarily:
frame an entirely new succession code;
prescribe different inheritance fractions;
compel Parliament to enact a uniform civil code.
Broad changes to personal law, involving:
policy;
religious doctrine;
competing social interests, generally fall within the legislative domain.
Dismissal on maintainability or institutional grounds does not necessarily amount to a decision approving the substantive fairness of the existing rules.

The petitioners were not merely asking the Court to interpret an uncertain statutory expression.
They sought alteration of the foundational Muslim-law scheme of:
sharers;
residuaries;
fixed inheritance fractions.
Granting the relief would require the Court to decide:
what equal shares should replace the existing system;
how spouses, parents, daughters and collateral relatives should rank;
whether Sunni and Shia rules should be changed identically;
how the revised scheme would interact with other personal-law obligations.
The Court held that such an exercise would amount to legislation.
It relied on authorities holding that courts cannot issue a mandamus directing Parliament to enact:
a uniform civil code;
particular personal-law reforms.
The Court acknowledged that succession and marriage have secular legal consequences and that personal laws have previously been reformed by legislation.
Nevertheless, the existence of a social or constitutional concern did not give the High Court power to create a replacement inheritance system through a PIL.
The proper forum for comprehensive reform was the legislature.
Importantly, the Court did not conduct a complete merits adjudication establishing that unequal shares were constitutionally valid.
It declined to decide the broad challenge in the procedural form presented.

The writ petition was dismissed.
The Court held that the changes sought had to be considered and enacted by the competent legislature.
It did not judicially substitute equal shares or redesign Muslim succession law.
Use this case for: courts will not comprehensively rewrite Muslim inheritance law through public interest litigation; the judgment should not be cited as a final merits approval of every existing rule.