Family Law

Lily Thomas v. Union of India

AIR 2000 SC 1650; (2000) 6 SCC 224

Facts

Review petitions were filed challenging the Supreme Court’s decision in Sarla Mudgal.
It was argued that the earlier ruling:
interfered with freedom of religion under Article 25;
incorrectly applied Hindu law after a person had converted to Islam;
retrospectively created criminal liability;
treated conversion as suspicious or invalid.
The petitioners maintained that once a Hindu man genuinely converted to Islam, his subsequent marriage should be governed by Muslim personal law.
The Court was therefore required to clarify the legal effect of conversion and the exact basis of bigamy liability.

Whether Sarla Mudgal violated religious freedom by holding a converted Hindu liable for a second marriage.
Whether a genuine conversion automatically dissolved the first Hindu marriage.
Whether applying Section 494 IPC amounted to retrospective criminal punishment.

Freedom of religion protects genuine conversion and the right to profess a new faith.
It does not automatically extinguish civil obligations created under an existing marriage.
A Hindu marriage remains subsisting until dissolved under the Hindu Marriage Act.
Conversion is a ground on which the other spouse may seek divorce under Section 13(1)(ii), but it is not itself a decree of dissolution.
Section 494 IPC already prohibited a second marriage during the lifetime of a spouse where the first marriage remained valid.
Therefore, the Court was interpreting existing law rather than creating a new offence.

The Supreme Court clarified that Sarla Mudgal did not declare conversion to Islam unlawful.
A person remained free to change religion honestly and sincerely.
The legal problem arose only when conversion was relied upon to contract another marriage without first ending the existing one.
The first marriage had created rights and obligations under the Hindu Marriage Act.
Those rights included the first wife’s marital status, maintenance claims and statutory protection against bigamy.
A unilateral conversion by the husband could not deprive her of those rights.
The Court rejected the argument that this position forced the convert to continue practising Hinduism.
It did not regulate his belief or worship; it merely required him to lawfully dissolve the earlier civil relationship before marrying again.
The Court also rejected the claim of retrospective punishment.
Section 494 already existed and applied whenever a person with a living spouse contracted another marriage in circumstances where the second marriage was void.
Sarla Mudgal had only explained how that provision operated when conversion was used to facilitate remarriage.
The Court reiterated that the second marriage remained void because the first marriage had never been dissolved.
Even a genuine conversion did not automatically alter this result.
The question was not whether the new faith was sincerely adopted, but whether the previous marital tie legally continued.

The review petitions were dismissed.
Sarla Mudgal was reaffirmed.
Genuine conversion is legally permissible, but it does not dissolve the convert’s existing Hindu marriage.
A second marriage during the subsistence of the first remains void and may attract Section 494 IPC.
Use this case for: religious conversion is valid, but it cannot by itself terminate civil marital obligations.