Family Law

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum

AIR 1985 SC 945; (1985) 2 SCC 556

Citation: AIR 1985 SC 945; (1985) 2 SCC 556
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 23 April 1985
Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud, D.A. Desai, O. Chinnappa Reddy, E.S. Venkataramiah and Rangnath Misra, JJ.

Facts

Shah Bano married Mohd. Ahmed Khan, an advocate, in 1932. They had three sons and two daughters.
In 1975, the husband drove her out of the matrimonial home.
In 1978, at about sixty-two years of age, Shah Bano filed an application under Section 125 CrPC, claiming that her husband had sufficient income but had stopped maintaining her.
During the proceedings, the husband pronounced an irrevocable talaq.
He argued that:
after divorce, his liability under Muslim law extended only through the iddat period;
he had paid maintenance during that period;
he had deposited ₹3,000 as deferred mahr;
Section 125 could no longer be used against him.
The Magistrate awarded ₹25 per month, which the Madhya Pradesh High Court enhanced to ₹179.20 per month.
The husband appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether a divorced Muslim woman unable to maintain herself can claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC beyond iddat.
Whether payment of mahr discharges the husband’s maintenance obligation.

Rule

Section 125 is a secular social-justice provision applying irrespective of the religion of the parties.
“Wife” under its Explanation includes a divorced woman who has not remarried.
Maintenance may be ordered where:
the husband has sufficient means;
he neglects or refuses to maintain the woman; and
she is unable to maintain herself.
Personal law cannot defeat this statutory protection.
Under Section 127(3)(b), maintenance may be cancelled where the woman has received the full amount payable to her on divorce under applicable personal law.
Mahr is an obligation arising from marriage; it is not, merely because payment is deferred until divorce, an amount paid in consideration of divorce.

Application

The Court rejected the argument that Section 125 ceased to apply once the parties were divorced.
Parliament expressly included a divorced woman within the definition of “wife” until remarriage.
The purpose of the provision is to prevent destitution and vagrancy, not to regulate religious doctrine.
Therefore, the essential question was whether Shah Bano could maintain herself, not whether the iddat period had expired.
The Court acknowledged the personal-law rule that a husband ordinarily maintains a divorced wife during iddat.
It held, however, that this rule could not determine a case where the woman remained indigent after iddat.
If the divorced woman could support herself, Section 125 would not be required.
Where she could not, the former husband’s statutory obligation continued, provided he had sufficient means.
The husband’s reliance on mahr was also rejected.
Mahr may be:
prompt, payable during marriage; or
deferred, commonly payable upon death or divorce.
The event fixing the time of payment does not determine the legal nature of the payment.
Mahr is connected with the marriage and the respect due to the wife; it is not compensation for divorce.
Consequently, payment of ₹3,000 did not automatically satisfy Section 127(3)(b) or provide Shah Bano with sufficient lifelong support.
The Court also examined Quranic materials and concluded that they did not support abandoning a divorced woman without fair provision.
There was therefore no unavoidable conflict between Muslim personal law and Section 125.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the husband’s appeal.
Shah Bano was entitled to maintenance under Section 125 beyond the iddat period because she was unable to maintain herself.
Section 125 applies to Muslim women as a secular remedy.
Payment of mahr did not automatically discharge the husband’s statutory liability.
The High Court’s award of ₹179.20 per month was upheld.
Use this case for: the right of a divorced Muslim woman to claim secular maintenance beyond iddat where she cannot support herself.