Family Law

Namdev Vyankat Ghadge v. Chandrakant Ganpat Ghadge

(2003) 4 SCC 71

Facts

Bali had two sons, Vyankat and Anand Rao.
Anand Rao died in 1930, leaving his widow, Krishnabai.
Under the law then applicable, Krishnabai had a maintenance right but no coparcenary share.
Vyankat became the sole surviving coparcener.
Vyankat died on 8 February 1978, leaving sons and daughters.
Upon his death, succession opened and his property vested in his heirs.
Approximately four months later, on 10 June 1978, Krishnabai adopted Dattatraya.
Dattatraya claimed that, as Anand Rao’s adopted son, he entered the coparcenary and became entitled to a share in the family property.
The lower courts accepted the adoption and allotted him a share.
Vyankat’s heirs challenged that result.

Whether an adopted son inducted after the death of the sole surviving coparcener can claim a share in property already vested in the deceased coparcener’s heirs.
Whether the adoption could divest those vested estates.

Adoption creates the legal status of a child in the adoptive family from the date of adoption.
Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act generally places an adopted child in the position of a natural-born child.
However, proviso (c) to Section 12 provides that adoption cannot divest any person of an estate that vested before the adoption.
Joint-family property does not lose its character merely because it is held by a sole surviving coparcener.
If another coparcener is introduced while the sole surviving coparcener remains alive, the new member may acquire an interest in the existing coparcenary.
The position changes where:
the sole surviving coparcener has died;
succession has already opened;
the property has vested in identifiable heirs.

The Court distinguished earlier cases in which a widow adopted a son while another sole surviving coparcener remained alive.
In those cases:
the coparcenary still existed;
no final succession had opened;
the existing coparcener’s fluctuating share could decrease upon introduction of the adopted son.
Here, Vyankat had already died before Dattatraya’s adoption.
His death caused the property to devolve immediately under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as it then stood.
Vyankat’s sons and daughters acquired vested rights on 8 February 1978.
Dattatraya did not enter the adoptive family until June.
Adoption could not operate retrospectively so as to:
reopen a completed succession;
take property away from persons in whom it had vested;
reconstruct a coparcenary that no longer existed in relation to that estate.
The doctrine of relation back under old Hindu law could not override the express protection in Section 12(c).
The lower courts had incorrectly applied cases involving adoption before the sole coparcener’s death.

Dattatraya’s adoption could not divest Vyankat’s heirs of property vested in them before the adoption.
He was not entitled to a share in the disputed property.
The judgments of the lower courts were set aside.
Use this case for: adoption cannot reopen succession or divest property already vested before the adoption.