Family Law

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey

AIR 2002 SC 591; (2002) 2 SCC 73

Facts

Savitri Pandey sought divorce alleging cruelty and desertion by her husband.
She also made allegations concerning his relationship with another woman.
The husband denied the allegations and contended that the wife herself had refused marital cohabitation.
The Family Court found that cruelty was not proved but nevertheless granted divorce on desertion.
No proper issue on desertion had been framed.
The High Court reversed the divorce decree, holding that neither cruelty nor desertion was established.
The wife appealed to the Supreme Court and also argued that the marriage had effectively broken down.

Whether ordinary marital disagreements amounted to cruelty.
Whether desertion was proved despite inadequate pleadings and absence of prior cohabitation.
Whether irretrievable breakdown alone justified divorce.

Cruelty may be physical or mental.
It requires conduct that makes continued matrimonial life harmful, injurious or reasonably intolerable.
Ordinary wear and tear, emotional sensitivity and routine marital disagreements do not amount to cruelty.
Desertion means intentional and permanent abandonment of matrimonial obligations without:
the other spouse’s consent; and
reasonable cause.
It requires both:
factum of separation; and
animus deserendi.
Desertion must be specifically pleaded and proved.
Separate living is not automatically desertion.
A petitioner cannot create the separation, prevent cohabitation and then rely upon that situation as a matrimonial offence.
Irretrievable breakdown was not an independent statutory ground under the HMA.

The wife’s allegations of cruelty were not supported by sufficient evidence.
The incidents proved were, at most, part of the normal wear and tear of married life.
Courts must judge cruelty objectively rather than solely by the heightened sensitivity of one spouse.
On desertion, the Family Court had granted relief without framing or properly trying the issue.
More importantly, the wife admitted that normal cohabitation and consummation had never developed after marriage.
She did not prove that the husband:
expelled her;
refused to receive her;
permanently rejected matrimonial obligations;
or formed animus deserendi.
Instead, the evidence suggested that she herself did not permit the ordinary matrimonial relationship to come into existence.
A spouse cannot complain that the other abandoned an existing state of cohabitation where the complaining spouse prevented that state from developing.
The Court therefore concluded that she was attempting to take advantage of her own conduct.
The mere fact that the parties had lived separately did not shift the burden automatically to the husband.
On irretrievable breakdown, the Court stated that a party cannot obtain divorce simply by asserting that the marriage is dead.
Breakdown may be relevant in exceptional circumstances, but it cannot replace the grounds enacted by Parliament.
The Court declined to use Article 142 because the wife’s own conduct had substantially contributed to the situation.

The Supreme Court dismissed the wife’s appeal.
Neither cruelty nor desertion was proved.
Separate living without permanent abandonment of matrimonial obligations was insufficient.
Irretrievable breakdown alone did not entitle her to divorce.
Use this case for: distinguishing cruelty from ordinary marital wear and requiring strict proof of desertion.