Family Law

Shabnam Hashmi v. Union of India

(2014) 4 SCC 1

Facts

Shabnam Hashmi filed a petition under Article 32 concerning the legal right of persons belonging to all religions to adopt children.
Under several personal-law systems, particularly traditional Muslim personal law, adoption did not create the same complete parent-child relationship recognised under Hindu law.
Muslim law traditionally recognised kafala, under which a child may be cared for but does not automatically become equivalent to a biological child for inheritance and lineage.
By this time, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, as amended in 2006, contained a secular adoption framework.
Section 41 permitted rehabilitation of orphaned, abandoned and surrendered children through adoption.
The All India Muslim Personal Law Board argued that statutory adoption should not compulsorily displace Muslim personal law.
The petition also asked the Court to recognise the right to adopt and the right to be adopted as fundamental rights.

Whether persons of every religion may adopt under the Juvenile Justice Act.
Whether personal law can prevent a person from using the secular statutory adoption route.
Whether adoption should be declared a fundamental right under Article 21.

The Juvenile Justice Act is a secular and enabling statute.
Its availability does not depend upon the prospective parent’s religion.
Personal law may continue to govern individuals who voluntarily choose to follow it.
However, personal law cannot prevent an individual from exercising an option expressly created by a secular statute.
Adoption under the JJ Act creates the legal parent-child relationship recognised by the statute.
Recognition of a new fundamental right requires institutional caution and need not occur where statutory protection is already available.

The Court harmonised the secular legislation with religious personal laws.
It did not compel every Muslim, Christian, Parsi or other person to adopt.
A person could continue to follow the rules of their personal law and use arrangements such as guardianship or kafala.
But where an individual chose formal adoption under the JJ Act, religious identity could not disqualify them.
The statutory route was optional, not coercive.
This approach protected:
individual choice;
religious freedom;
the welfare of children needing permanent families.
The Court observed that the JJ Act was designed primarily for child welfare.
Its operation could not be confined by the religious rules of prospective parents.
However, it declined to elevate adoption immediately into a fundamental right.
Social institutions and personal-law systems were still evolving, and the case could be fully resolved through statutory interpretation.
The existence of a secular adoption framework made a broader constitutional declaration unnecessary.

Any person, irrespective of religion, may adopt a child under the Juvenile Justice Act.
Personal law does not override the statutory option.
Persons remain free to follow personal law if they do not wish to adopt under the Act.
The Court declined, at that stage, to declare adoption or being adopted a fundamental right.
Use this case for: religion-neutral adoption under the secular Juvenile Justice framework.