Family Law

Vijayalakshmamma v. B.T. Shankar

(2001) 4 SCC 558

Facts

A.T. Nanjappa Rao died in 1968 without children.
He left behind two widows:
Sharadamma, the senior widow;
Neelamma, the junior widow.
B.T. Shankar claimed that Sharadamma adopted him in June 1970.
He was the son of the deceased husband’s elder brother.
An adoption deed was executed, and Shankar’s name was later entered in revenue records as the deceased’s son.
Neelamma and Vijayalakshmamma disputed this adoption.
They claimed that Vijayalakshmamma had instead been adopted by the widows.
The courts rejected their alleged adoption and accepted Shankar’s adoption.
They then argued alternatively that Sharadamma’s adoption of Shankar was invalid because the junior widow had not consented.
The High Court upheld the adoption but protected Neelamma’s half share in property already vested in her.

Whether a senior Hindu widow requires the consent of a junior co-widow before adopting a child.
Whether the adopted child could divest the junior widow of property already vested in her.

Section 8 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 gives an eligible female Hindu independent capacity to adopt.
The consent requirement contained in Section 7 applies where a male Hindu adopts while his wife or wives are living.
That requirement cannot be imported into Section 8.
Courts cannot add conditions deliberately omitted by Parliament.
Under Section 12:
an adopted child becomes the child of the adoptive parent for all purposes;
adoption cannot divest any person of property already vested before adoption.
A widow’s adoption is treated as adoption into the deceased husband’s family, but it remains subject to vested-property protection.

The Court rejected the argument that the senior widow needed the junior widow’s permission.
Parliament had separately regulated:
adoption by men under Section 7;
adoption by women under Section 8.
Section 7 expressly mentions consent of living wives.
Section 8 contains no requirement that a widow obtain consent from:
another widow;
the husband’s relatives;
the sapindas.
This omission was conscious and consistent with the statute’s recognition of a woman’s independent legal capacity.
Reading a consent requirement into Section 8 would:
rewrite the legislation;
revive restrictions from uncodified Hindu law;
make a widow’s statutory power dependent on another person.
Sharadamma’s adoption of Shankar was therefore valid.
However, when Nanjappa Rao died in 1968, his estate had already vested in the two widows.
The subsequent adoption could not retrospectively take away Neelamma’s vested half share.
Section 12(c) expressly protects property vested in another person before the adoption.
Shankar could consequently claim through Sharadamma, but could not divest Neelamma.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal challenging Shankar’s adoption.
A senior widow does not require the junior widow’s consent to adopt under Section 8.
The adoption was valid and operated within the deceased husband’s family.
The junior widow’s previously vested property share remained protected.
Use this case for: a Hindu widow’s independent capacity to adopt and the rule against divesting vested estates.