Intellectual Property Rights

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation

714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)

Facts

Apple produced the Apple II personal computer and operating-system programs.
The operating programs were stored in read-only memory (“ROM”) chips and enabled the computer to perform essential functions.
Franklin manufactured a competing computer designed to be compatible with Apple software.
Franklin copied several Apple operating-system programs almost identically into its own ROM chips.
Franklin argued that object code embedded in ROM was not copyrightable.
It also argued that operating-system programs were merely functional processes or methods of operation.
The District Court denied Apple a preliminary injunction.
Apple appealed to the Third Circuit.

Whether computer programs expressed in object code are protected by copyright.
Whether fixation in a ROM chip satisfies copyright requirements.
Whether an operating-system program is excluded merely because it performs a functional task.
Whether compatibility prevents copyright protection.

A computer program may be protected whether expressed in:
human-readable source code; or
machine-readable object code.
A work is fixed when it is embodied in a medium from which it can be perceived, reproduced or communicated with the aid of a machine.
Storage in ROM constitutes fixation.
Copyright protects the expression embodied in a program, not the underlying process, function or method.
Functional purpose does not make all program code unprotectable.
Under the merger doctrine, protection may be limited where an idea can be expressed in only one or very few ways.

Franklin had copied Apple’s programs almost verbatim rather than merely designing software performing similar functions.
Machine readability did not prevent protection.
Copyright law expressly contemplates works perceived with the aid of a machine.
ROM storage was sufficiently permanent and stable to satisfy fixation.
The Court rejected the broad argument that operating systems were uncopyrightable because computers required them to function.
Many literary and technical works serve functional purposes while retaining protected expression.
The relevant distinction was between:
the function the program performs; and
the particular code selected to perform it.
Franklin needed to show that Apple’s particular expression was dictated by necessity or that substantially similar expression was unavoidable.
It had not established that only one or a very small number of programs could perform the required operating functions.
Compatibility was a commercial objective, but it did not create a general right to make exact copies of protected code.
Franklin remained free to write its own compatible operating system, subject to technical and legal constraints.
The Court considered Apple likely to succeed because the copying was extensive and the asserted defences had not been factually established.
The denial of preliminary relief rested on an incorrect view of software copyrightability.

The Third Circuit held that object code and operating-system programs are capable of copyright protection.
Programs fixed in ROM are sufficiently fixed.
Functional purpose does not eliminate protection for the author’s particular code.
The denial of preliminary injunction was reversed and the matter remanded.
Use this case for: computer programs remain copyrightable in object code and ROM even when they perform functional operating-system tasks.