Interpretation of Statutes

Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy

(1970) 2 SCC 272; AIR 1970 SC 1573

Citation: (1970) 2 SCC 272; AIR 1970 SC 1573
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 8 May 1970
Bench: M. Hidayatullah C.J., J.C. Shah, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray and I.D. Dua, JJ.

Facts

During proceedings in the Lok Sabha, Members of Parliament made statements concerning a religious leader.
The statements were alleged to be defamatory.
Followers of the religious leader filed a civil claim for damages against:
the Members who made the statements; and
the Speaker.
Article 105(2) of the Constitution provides that no Member of Parliament shall be liable to any court proceeding in respect of “anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament.”
The plaintiffs argued that immunity should not extend to statements that were irrelevant, malicious or defamatory.
The defendants relied upon the absolute wording of the constitutional protection.
The interpretative question was whether “anything said” admitted implied exceptions based on the content or motive of the speech.

Whether Article 105(2) granted absolute immunity for statements made during parliamentary proceedings.
Whether courts could examine whether the statement was relevant, proper or made in good faith.
How the words “anything” and “in Parliament” should be interpreted.

The word “anything” is of the widest possible scope unless the context restricts it.
A constitutional immunity framed in absolute language cannot be reduced by importing qualifications absent from the text.
“In Parliament” refers to statements made during the functioning and business of the House.
The Court must distinguish:
the width of the protected subject matter; and
the location or occasion necessary for the protection.
Political or moral impropriety does not remove legal immunity where the constitutional text is absolute.

The statements were made by Members while the Lok Sabha was conducting its proceedings.
They therefore satisfied the requirement of being said “in Parliament.”
Article 105(2) did not protect only:
relevant statements;
truthful statements;
good-faith statements; or
statements permitted under ordinary defamation law.
It protected anything said in the required institutional setting.
Reading exceptions for malice or irrelevance would require the Court to insert words that the Constitution did not contain.
Such an approach would also permit courts to examine parliamentary debate and determine whether a Member’s contribution was sufficiently connected to the business of the House.
That judicial scrutiny would undermine the freedom and independence the immunity was designed to secure.
The Court explained that parliamentary institutions possess their own mechanisms for:
discipline;
expunging remarks;
enforcing procedure; and
dealing with misuse of privilege.
The existence of immunity did not mean that every statement was ethically justified.
It meant only that civil or criminal courts could not impose liability for it.
The Speaker was also protected in relation to official conduct connected with the proceedings.
The Court therefore applied the literal breadth of the constitutional words, reinforced by their institutional purpose.

The Supreme Court rejected the civil action.
Article 105(2) conferred complete immunity from court proceedings for anything said by a Member during parliamentary business.
No exception based on defamation, malice or irrelevance could be judicially added.
Use this case for: literal interpretation of absolute constitutional language and refusal to qualify the word “anything.”