Labour Law

U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Ismail

AIR 1991 SC 1099; (1991) 3 SCC 239

Facts

Several drivers employed by the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation were found medically unfit to continue driving heavy passenger vehicles.
Their impaired eyesight or other medical condition made continued driving unsafe.
The Corporation terminated their services under the applicable service regulations.
Regulation 17(3) gave the Corporation discretion to consider alternative employment for a medically unfit driver where a suitable post was available.
The drivers approached the High Court.
The High Court directed the Corporation to provide alternative employment instead of terminating them.
The Corporation appealed.
It argued that:
the regulation conferred discretion rather than a mandatory right;
courts could not create posts;
passenger safety was paramount; and
alternative work depended upon availability and suitability.
The workers relied upon fairness and long service.

Whether medically unfit drivers had an enforceable right to alternative employment.
Whether Regulation 17(3) imposed a duty or merely conferred discretion.
Whether the High Court could direct the Corporation to exercise discretion in a particular way.

A transport undertaking may remove a driver who is medically incapable of safely performing driving duties.
Where service regulations permit alternative employment, the authority must:
consider the matter fairly;
avoid discrimination;
act on relevant material; and
genuinely exercise discretion.
A provision stating that alternative employment “may” be offered does not automatically create an absolute right.
Courts may compel the authority to consider the discretion according to law.
They ordinarily cannot:
create vacancies;
dictate appointment to a particular post; or
convert discretionary policy into a mandatory entitlement.
Safety-sensitive employment may justify termination where the essential function can no longer be performed.

The drivers could no longer safely discharge the central duty for which they were employed.
Continuing them as drivers could endanger:
passengers;
other road users; and
public property.
Their medical incapacity was not treated as misconduct.
The question was therefore whether they had to be absorbed elsewhere.
Regulation 17(3) allowed the Corporation to examine:
available vacancies;
physical suitability;
qualifications;
administrative need; and
financial implications.
The High Court replaced that assessment with a direct command to provide alternative work.
The Supreme Court held that this went beyond judicial review.
A court could require the Corporation to:
consider each driver;
apply uniform standards; and
avoid arbitrary preferences.
It could not assume that a suitable vacancy existed in every case.
The Corporation was nevertheless expected to exercise the discretion humanely and genuinely.
It could not automatically reject every medically unfit driver while granting accommodation selectively to favoured employees.
The judgment therefore balanced:
operational safety;
statutory discretion; and
fair treatment of employees losing their occupation through medical incapacity.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s absolute direction requiring alternative employment.
It held that the Corporation had discretion, not an unconditional duty, under the regulation.
The authority was required to consider cases fairly and without discrimination.
Use this case for: courts may require lawful consideration of alternative employment but cannot convert a discretionary service regulation into an absolute absorption right.