Property Law

Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag

AIR 1967 SC 1440; (1967) 2 SCR 18

Facts

The property was mortgaged by conditional sale.
The mortgagors later transferred their equity of redemption to Hazra.
When the mortgage debt was not paid, the mortgagee instituted a foreclosure suit.
The trial court intended to pass a preliminary decree for foreclosure but accidentally used wording appropriate to a decree for sale.
Hazra appealed.
During the appeal, Krishna Kumar Nag purchased the mortgaged property at a court auction in execution of a separate money decree against Hazra.
The trial court later corrected its accidental error and passed a final foreclosure decree.
The auction purchaser argued that he should be allowed to redeem the mortgage or recover possession.

Whether lis pendens applies to an involuntary court sale.
Whether the court-auction purchaser acquired rights superior to Hazra’s rights.
Whether the accidental error in the preliminary mortgage decree could be corrected.

The doctrine of lis pendens applies to transactions occurring while litigation over the property remains pending.
Its principle extends to involuntary alienations, including court sales.
A pendente lite purchaser steps into the position of the judgment debtor and takes subject to the eventual decree.
Courts may correct clerical or accidental errors under Sections 151 and 152 CPC to reflect the judgment’s true intention.

Krishna Kumar Nag bought the property while the appeal in the foreclosure proceedings was still pending.
He therefore acquired only whatever interest Hazra would ultimately retain after the mortgage litigation.
Hazra’s equity of redemption was subject to the pending foreclosure suit.
Once the final foreclosure decree extinguished that equity, the auction purchaser had no independent right to revive it.
It made no difference that the acquisition arose through a court sale rather than a voluntary conveyance.
Otherwise, litigating parties could defeat pending proceedings by allowing the property to be sold through execution of another decree.
The preliminary decree’s reference to a sale was an accidental drafting error.
The judgment and nature of the suit clearly showed that foreclosure was intended.
The court could correct the slip; the auction purchaser had not acquired any independent equity by relying upon it.

Lis pendens applied to the court-auction purchase.
The purchaser was bound by the final foreclosure decree.
He acquired no better title than Hazra possessed and could not reopen the extinguished right of redemption.
The trial court validly corrected the accidental error.