Tort Law

Wilkinson v. Downton

[1897] 2 QB 57

Facts

• Mr Downton decided to play what he regarded as a practical joke on Mrs Wilkinson.
• He falsely informed her that her husband had suffered a serious accident and was lying at The Elms in Leytonstone with both legs broken.
• He told her that she should immediately take a cab and two pillows to bring her injured husband home.
• Downton intended Mrs Wilkinson to believe the statement, although he knew that it was false.
• The news produced a violent shock to Mrs Wilkinson’s nervous system.
• She experienced vomiting and other serious physical and psychological consequences. Her condition threatened her reason and caused weeks of suffering and incapacity.
• The illness did not result from any previous weakness, ill-health or unusual predisposition.
• Expenses were also incurred when persons travelled to Leytonstone in response to the false message.
• There had been no physical touching and no threat of immediate force. The facts therefore did not fit comfortably within battery or assault. Mrs Wilkinson sought damages for the illness and financial loss caused by the deliberate falsehood.

• Whether a person can be liable for deliberately using words to cause severe shock and consequent physical or psychiatric harm.
• Whether liability required proof that Downton specifically desired the exact medical injury that resulted.
• Whether Mrs Wilkinson could recover when the case did not fall within assault, battery or an ordinary negligence claim.

• A defendant commits an actionable wrong where the defendant:
o wilfully performs an act directed at the claimant;
o the act is calculated to cause physical harm;
o there is no lawful justification; and
o physical harm is actually caused.
• “Malice” in this context does not require personal spite or hatred.
• The original decision treated an act as calculated to cause harm where its natural character made some relevant harmful consequence sufficiently apparent.
• The modern formulation, clarified in Rhodes v. OPO, requires:
o unjustified words or conduct directed towards the claimant;
o an actual intention to cause physical harm or at least severe emotional distress; and
o physical harm or a recognised psychiatric illness.

• Downton’s statement was not an innocent mistake. He deliberately invented the accident and intended Mrs Wilkinson to believe him.
• The message was directed specifically at her and concerned the supposed catastrophic injury of her husband.
• Although Downton described the conduct as a joke, the obvious purpose of such a joke was to shock and seriously upset its recipient.
• There was no justification or reasonable excuse for deliberately communicating the false information.
• Mrs Wilkinson’s reaction went beyond ordinary sadness, annoyance or momentary distress. She suffered identifiable illness, physical symptoms, incapacity and continuing medical consequences.
• The causal connection was direct. The illness followed from the shock produced by the false message rather than from an independent event.
• Wright J rejected the idea that the lack of touching defeated the claim. The law protected Mrs Wilkinson’s personal safety against deliberately inflicted serious harm caused through words as well as physical force.
• Downton did not need to foresee or desire every symptom that developed. Once he deliberately employed conduct calculated to cause serious shock and that conduct produced physical harm, he was responsible for the resulting injury.
• The court consequently recognised a distinct cause of action that filled the gap between intentional trespass and negligence.

• Wright J entered judgment for Mrs Wilkinson.
• She was awarded £100 for her illness and suffering, together with the small amount spent on railway fares in reliance on the false message.
• The court held that deliberately causing physical harm through severe nervous shock could be actionable even without physical contact or apprehension of immediate violence.
• The decision established the foundation of the tort now described as intentionally causing physical or psychological harm.
• Its language concerning imputed intention was later narrowed by Rhodes v. OPO, but the central protection against deliberately inflicted serious psychiatric harm survives.