Criminal Procedure Code

Balasaheb Rangnath Khade v. State of Maharashtra

decided 21 September 2011

Facts

Several victim appeals were placed before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court.
They arose after the 2009 amendment inserted the proviso to Section 372 CrPC.
The proviso gave a victim a right to appeal against:
acquittal;
conviction for a lesser offence;
or inadequate compensation.
The central preliminary question was whether a victim appealing an acquittal to the High Court had to first obtain leave under Section 378(3).
Justice V.M. Kanade and Justice A.M. Thipsay reached different conclusions.
Justice Kanade held that no leave was required.
Justice Thipsay held that an acquittal appeal remained subject to the leave requirement.
The difference was later placed before a third Judge, who agreed with the no-leave view.
The case thus became an important early authority concerning the newly created appellate rights of victims.

Does the proviso to Section 372 give the victim an unrestricted appeal against acquittal?
Must Section 372 be read together with the leave requirement under Section 378(3)?

Justice Kanade’s view
The victim’s appeal is a substantive statutory right created to remedy the victim’s earlier exclusion from criminal proceedings.
Parliament was aware that Section 378 expressly required leave for:
State appeals;
and complainant appeals.
Yet Parliament did not insert a similar requirement in the proviso to Section 372.
Courts should therefore not add a condition omitted by the legislature.
The proviso covers three different grievances, and leave cannot be imported merely because one category concerns acquittal.
Justice Thipsay’s view
The proviso must be read as part of the complete appellate chapter.
An appeal against acquittal has traditionally required prior judicial screening.
Merely describing the appellant as a victim should not place the appeal on a higher footing than the State’s acquittal appeal.
Therefore, Section 378(3) should continue to apply.
Present legal position
In Satya Pal Singh, the Supreme Court held that a victim appealing an acquittal to the High Court must obtain leave under Section 378(3).
Accordingly, Justice Thipsay’s position reflects the presently binding Supreme Court rule on leave. ( )

The majority approach focused on legislative purpose:
historically the State controlled the prosecution;
a victim could ordinarily file only a limited revision;
and a revisional court could not directly convert acquittal into conviction.
The amendment was intended to give victims a meaningful independent remedy.
Requiring an additional leave application, despite silence in the proviso, was viewed by the majority as unnecessarily narrowing that remedy.
The dissent focused instead on appellate structure and the special protection attached to acquittals.
An acquitted person enjoys a strengthened presumption of innocence.
Screening through leave prevents every acquittal from automatically becoming a full High Court appeal.
The difference therefore concerned not whether victims had rights, but how those rights should operate procedurally.
Subsequent Supreme Court law resolved that conflict by requiring leave where the victim appeals to the High Court against acquittal.

The Division Bench delivered a split decision.
After reference, the third Judge agreed that leave was not required, making that the operative Bombay High Court position at that time.
Nevertheless, the later Supreme Court decision in Satya Pal Singh supersedes that conclusion.
The case remains important for:
the historical development of victim appellate rights;
the competing interpretations of Sections 372 and 378;
and the distinction between the existence of a right and the procedure regulating its exercise.