Criminal Procedure Code

Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav

(2005) 2 SCC 42

Facts

Rajesh Ranjan, popularly known as Pappu Yadav, was prosecuted for allegedly conspiring to murder Ajit Sarkar, a sitting MLA, and others.
He faced charges for murder, attempt to murder, criminal conspiracy and offences under the Arms Act.
He repeatedly applied for bail. Before the order challenged in this case:
several applications had been rejected;
two orders granting him bail had already been set aside by the Supreme Court;
and courts had earlier found a prima facie case against him.
His ninth bail application was filed only eleven days after the Supreme Court had cancelled an earlier bail order.
No significant new fact, evidence or change in law had arisen during those eleven days.
Nevertheless, the Patna High Court granted bail after reconsidering:
whether a prima facie case existed;
and the evidentiary value of a retracted confession.
The complainant and the CBI challenged the order before the Supreme Court. ( )

Can an accused file successive bail applications after earlier applications have been rejected?
Can a later court reconsider the same grounds without any material change in circumstances?
Is prolonged custody by itself sufficient to grant bail in a serious offence?

The principles of strict res judicata do not apply to bail proceedings. Therefore, a fresh bail application is not absolutely barred.
However, judicial discipline requires the later court to:
examine why the earlier application was rejected;
identify a material change in facts or law;
and give specific reasons for taking a different view.
The same grounds ordinarily cannot be repeatedly raised merely before different Benches.
A later court cannot effectively review or overrule an earlier decision of:
a coordinate Bench;
or a superior court.
Relevant bail considerations include:
existence of a prima facie case;
gravity of the accusation;
likely punishment;
risk of absconding;
possibility of influencing witnesses;
and likelihood of obstructing justice.
Lengthy detention is relevant, but cannot be treated as the sole consideration in every serious case.
Under the BNSS, corresponding regular-bail powers are principally contained in Sections 480 and 483.

Earlier courts had already considered the existence of a prima facie case and the retracted confession.
The Supreme Court had also previously cancelled bail because important considerations such as:
gravity of the offence;
threats to witnesses;
and the prima facie prosecution material had not been adequately considered.
The ninth application did not disclose any material factual or legal change.
The High Court nevertheless reconsidered the same questions as though the bail matter was being heard for the first time.
In doing so, it substituted its own view for findings already recorded by the High Court and Supreme Court.
This was not merely a fresh exercise of bail discretion. It effectively made the earlier binding decisions meaningless.
The Court clarified that a subsequent application may succeed where, for example:
important witnesses have been examined;
the prosecution case has materially weakened;
health conditions have substantially changed;
the trial has been indefinitely delayed;
or a relevant legal position has changed.
But the applicant must specifically establish such a change.
Here, eleven days had passed and nothing new had occurred.
The allegations of political influence and interference with the prosecution also made an unreasoned release particularly unsafe.
Article 21 protects personal liberty, but it does not confer a right to repeatedly reopen identical bail grounds until a favourable Bench is found.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order granting bail.
It dismissed the ninth bail application.
The Court held that successive bail applications are permissible only within a limited area where:
material circumstances have changed;
the earlier finding has become obsolete;
or a change in law justifies reconsideration.
A later court must record the fresh ground that permits departure from the earlier decision. ( )