Criminal Procedure Code

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum

(1985) 2 SCC 556

Citation: (1985) 2 SCC 556
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 23 April 1985
Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud CJ, D.A. Desai, O. Chinnappa Reddy, E.S. Venkataramiah and Ranganath Misra JJ. (Constitution Bench)

Facts

Shah Bano married Mohd. Ahmed Khan in 1932, and they had five children.
In 1975, the husband drove her out of the matrimonial home.
She applied under Section 125 CrPC seeking maintenance.
During the proceedings, the husband pronounced an irrevocable talaq.
He argued that:
she was no longer his “wife”;
his obligation ended after the iddat period;
and payment of mahr discharged any further responsibility.
The Magistrate awarded ₹25 per month.
The High Court increased the amount to ₹179.20 per month.
The husband appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that Muslim personal law excluded continued liability under Section 125. ( )

Whether Section 125 applies to a divorced Muslim woman unable to maintain herself.
Whether payment of mahr or expiry of iddat automatically defeats maintenance.

Section 125 is a secular, summary remedy designed to prevent:
destitution;
vagrancy;
and neglect.
“Wife” expressly includes a woman who:
has been divorced;
has not remarried;
and is unable to maintain herself.
The provision applies irrespective of religion.
The relevant requirements are:
sufficient means of the husband;
neglect or refusal;
and inability of the claimant to maintain herself.
Mahr is not automatically a substitute for maintenance.
Under Section 127(3)(b), cancellation depends upon whether a sum was genuinely payable on divorce and sufficiently satisfies the legal requirement.
BNSS Section 144 now corresponds to Section 125.

The statutory definition did not exclude Muslim divorced women.
The Court refused to read a religious exception into clear secular language.
Shah Bano:
had not remarried;
lacked sufficient means;
and had been neglected by a husband with adequate financial capacity.
Therefore, the central statutory conditions were satisfied.
Pronouncement of talaq did not erase her status as a divorced “wife” for Section 125.
The Court also rejected the argument that mahr was necessarily a divorce-maintenance payment.
Mahr is an incident of marriage and a mark of obligation or respect.
Merely because deferred mahr becomes payable at divorce does not mean that it was created as complete financial support after divorce.
A small payment cannot realistically protect an indigent woman from destitution.
Section 125 does not regulate the entire personal-law relationship.
It intervenes only where a person with sufficient means leaves a close dependant unable to survive.
The husband’s liability continues where the divorced wife cannot maintain herself.
Subsequent legislation—the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986—altered the statutory framework, but Danial Latifi later interpreted that Act as requiring a fair and reasonable provision for the divorced woman’s future.

The Supreme Court dismissed the husband’s appeal and upheld Shah Bano’s maintenance.
It held that Section 125 applies to a divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and cannot maintain herself.
Payment of mahr did not automatically discharge the maintenance obligation.
The case established the secular and anti-destitution character of Section 125. ( )