Criminal Procedure Code

R. Mohan v. A.K. Vijaya Kumar

(2012) 8 SCC 721

Facts

R. Mohan was prosecuted for dishonour of a cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
The Magistrate convicted him and imposed:
three months’ simple imprisonment;
compensation of ₹5 lakh under Section 357(3) CrPC;
and two months’ simple imprisonment in default of paying compensation.
The Sessions Court confirmed the order.
The Madras High Court maintained:
the conviction;
the substantive imprisonment;
and the compensation.
However, it held that a separate default imprisonment could not be imposed for failure to pay compensation where substantive imprisonment had already been awarded.
Both the accused and the complainant approached the Supreme Court.
The important CrPC question concerned enforcement of compensation awarded under Section 357(3). ( )

Can a court impose imprisonment in default of payment of compensation under Section 357(3)?
Is default imprisonment an additional substantive sentence?
How are compensation orders enforced under the CrPC?

Section 357(3) enables a court to direct the accused to pay compensation even where fine does not form part of the substantive sentence.
Section 431 provides that money payable under a CrPC order, where no specific recovery method is stated, may be recovered as though it were a fine.
Section 421 prescribes methods for recovering fine, including:
attachment and sale of movable property;
or recovery through the Collector.
A court may support a compensation order by prescribing default imprisonment.
Default imprisonment is not punishment for the original offence.
It is a coercive mechanism intended to secure compliance with the monetary order.
The accused’s liability to pay does not necessarily disappear merely because the default sentence has been served.
While fixing compensation and default imprisonment, the court should consider:
amount involved;
paying capacity;
nature of the transaction;
and reasonable time required for payment.
Compensation must not become an arbitrary or impossible demand.

The High Court treated compensation under Section 357(3) as though it were a civil decree that could not be supported by a criminal default clause.
The Supreme Court rejected that distinction because Section 431 expressly connects compensation with the machinery for recovery of fine.
Without an effective enforcement mechanism, an accused could:
retain the benefit obtained through the dishonoured cheque;
ignore the compensation order;
and render Section 357(3) ineffective.
The default term did not increase the three-month substantive sentence for the cheque offence.
It would operate only if Mohan failed to comply with the independent compensation direction.
The Court distinguished:
substantive imprisonment imposed because the offence was proved;
from default imprisonment arising because the monetary order was disobeyed.
The fact that both appeared in the same sentencing order did not make the default clause illegal.
At the same time, the Court recognised that payment of ₹5 lakh might require time.
A criminal court should make enforcement realistic rather than immediately imprisoning an accused who is making genuine arrangements to comply.
Therefore, while restoring the default sentence, the Court granted a specified opportunity to pay.

The Supreme Court upheld:
the conviction;
three months’ simple imprisonment;
and compensation of ₹5 lakh.
It restored the direction that Mohan would undergo two months’ simple imprisonment in default of payment.
It held that compensation under Section 357(3) can be enforced through a default sentence because Sections 421 and 431 permit recovery as a fine.
Mohan was granted time to deposit the compensation.
The judgment establishes that victim compensation under Section 357(3) is an enforceable criminal-court order, not merely an advisory direction. ( )