Criminal Procedure Code

Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government of NCT of Delhi

(2017) 2 SCC 18

Facts

An obscene video clip was offered for sale through the online platform Bazee.com.
Criminal proceedings were initiated against persons connected with the platform.
Allegations were framed under:
Section 292 IPC concerning obscene material;
and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act concerning electronic publication or transmission.
Sharat Babu Digumarti was discharged from the IT Act offence.
The prosecution nevertheless sought to continue against him under the general IPC provision.
He argued that the special statutory scheme governing electronic content displaced the general offence in the circumstances.

Whether prosecution under Section 292 IPC could continue after discharge under the specific IT Act provision.
How the rule concerning special and general statutes applies at the charge stage.
Whether continuing the IPC charge amounted to abuse of process.

A special statute dealing specifically with a subject ordinarily prevails over a general law covering the field more broadly.
The IT Act contains a specialised framework governing:
electronic records;
online publication;
transmission;
intermediary conduct;
and related offences.
Where the factual allegation falls squarely within the special electronic-content provision, the prosecution cannot avoid that statute’s requirements by relying only on a general IPC offence.
The court must examine:
the ingredients;
the nature of the medium;
the accused’s alleged role;
and the legislative scheme.
Discharge from the special offence may make continuation under the general provision impermissible where both rest on the same alleged electronic act.

The alleged material was not distributed through an ordinary printed or physical medium by Sharat Babu.
The prosecution theory concerned:
an online platform;
an electronic listing;
and digital transmission.
Those facts were specifically governed by the IT Act.
Once the accused was discharged from the relevant special offence, the prosecution could not preserve substantially the same case by relabelling it under Section 292.
That approach would:
bypass the conditions of the special law;
defeat its intermediary framework;
and make the discharge meaningless.
The Court did not hold that Section 292 can never apply where technology is involved.
The conclusion depended upon:
the precise allegations;
statutory overlap;
and the fact that the special law directly occupied the field.
The High Court should therefore have prevented continuation of a prosecution that lacked an independent general-law foundation.
The case illustrates that charge-stage courts must consider not only factual sufficiency but also:
statutory exclusivity;
overriding clauses;
and legal maintainability.

The Supreme Court quashed continuation of the IPC prosecution.
It held that the IT Act, as the special legislation governing the alleged electronic publication, prevailed in the circumstances.
Once the accused had been discharged under that special provision, the same factual allegation could not continue through the general IPC route. ( )