Criminal Procedure Code

Yanab Sheikh alias Gagu v. State of West Bengal

(2013) 6 SCC 428

Facts

A violent incident resulted in the death of the victim after a bomb was thrown during an altercation.
A person went to a post office and telephoned the police station.
He only informed the police that a murder had occurred in the village and asked them to come.
On receiving the call, the police made a General Diary entry and proceeded to the place of occurrence.
At the scene, a detailed written complaint identifying the incident and participants was given to the police.
That written complaint was formally registered as the FIR.
Yanab Sheikh argued that the earlier General Diary entry was the true FIR and that the later written complaint was an impermissible second FIR. ( )

Section 154 CrPC applies to information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence.
A communication is not an FIR merely because it is the first message received by police.
The court must examine:
the content of the message;
whether it contains identifiable details of the offence;
whether it was intended to set the law formally in motion; and
whether it was only a request for police assistance.
A vague or cryptic telephone message asking police to reach the scene is ordinarily not an FIR.
A later detailed statement may be treated as the FIR.
Ordinarily, there cannot be two FIRs concerning:
the same occurrence;
the same accused;
the same version; and
the same scope of investigation.
The “test of sameness” must be applied.
Separate FIRs may still be permissible for:
a counter-version;
a distinct occurrence;
a different transaction; or
newly discovered and materially different criminal activity.
Sections 173 and 181 BNSS correspond broadly to Sections 154 and 162 CrPC.

The telephone caller did not give details regarding:
the identity of the assailants;
the manner of attack;
the weapon used;
the motive;
or the complete nature of the offence.
The object of the call was simply to bring the police to the village.
The General Diary entry therefore recorded an emergency intimation rather than a formal accusation.
Treating every such message as an FIR would create practical injustice.
Police often receive calls saying only:
“a fight has occurred”;
“someone is injured”; or
“please come immediately.”
Such calls enable urgent response but do not necessarily provide the information required under Section 154.
The detailed written complaint was different.
It identified the occurrence, contained substantive allegations and was signed by the informant.
It was therefore the first legally sufficient information report.
Since the General Diary entry was not an FIR, the written complaint could not be characterised as a second FIR.
The Court also explained that the rule against multiple FIRs protects suspects from repeated investigations concerning the same incident.
That safeguard remains important, but it cannot be applied to convert a vague emergency call into a complete FIR.
The procedural challenge to the prosecution therefore failed.

The Supreme Court held that the cryptic telephone call and General Diary entry did not constitute an FIR.
The subsequent detailed written complaint was the valid first FIR.
There was therefore no impermissible second FIR.
The case is an important authority for distinguishing an emergency intimation from information formally setting the criminal law in motion. ( )