Judgement Briefs

Evidence Law

Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh

AIR 2019 SC 1857; (2019) 13 SCC 1

Citation
AIR 2019 SC 1857; (2019) 13 SCC 1
Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
9 April 2019
Bench
L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah JJ.

Facts

  • Anurag Soni and the prosecutrix knew each other and were in a relationship.
  • The prosecutrix stated that Anurag repeatedly promised to marry her.
  • Relying upon that promise, she consented to sexual relations.
  • The accused later refused to marry her.
  • Evidence showed that, while continuing to assure the prosecutrix of marriage:
  • his family was negotiating his marriage with another woman;
  • he was aware of those arrangements;
  • he did not disclose them to the prosecutrix.
  • The prosecutrix alleged that her consent had been obtained through a false promise.
  • The trial court convicted Anurag of rape.
  • The High Court affirmed the conviction.
  • The accused argued that:
  • the relationship was consensual;
  • the promise was genuine when made;
  • later failure to marry did not retrospectively convert consensual intercourse into rape.
  • The evidentiary question was whether his intention at the time of making the promise could be inferred from subsequent and surrounding conduct.
  • This is not technically a statutory-presumption judgment, even though it is sometimes placed under that syllabus heading.

Issue

  • Whether the promise of marriage was false from its inception.
  • Whether the prosecutrix consented because of a misconception of fact.
  • What evidence could establish the accused’s state of mind when the promise was made.

Rule

  • Mere breach of a genuine promise to marry does not automatically establish rape.
  • The prosecution must distinguish between:
  • a promise honestly made but later not fulfilled; and
  • a promise which the accused never intended to fulfil.
  • Intention is a mental fact and is rarely proved through direct evidence.
  • It may be inferred from:
  • contemporaneous conduct;
  • concealment of material facts;
  • parallel marriage negotiations;
  • the timing of the refusal;
  • consistency of the prosecutrix’s account.
  • The prosecution must establish a direct connection between:
  • the false promise;
  • the prosecutrix’s consent.
  • The court must not presume falsity merely because the parties did not eventually marry.

Application

  • The Court examined the accused’s conduct at the time he continued making assurances.
  • The evidence showed that his marriage with another woman was not a sudden later development.
  • Arrangements were already progressing while he continued to represent to the prosecutrix that he would marry her.
  • He knew that his family had fixed or was finalising another marriage.
  • He concealed this fact.
  • The concealment was important because it showed that:
  • his assurance did not reflect his actual intention;
  • he was inducing the prosecutrix to act upon information he knew to be false.
  • The prosecutrix’s evidence was found:
  • consistent;
  • natural;
  • supported by surrounding circumstances.
  • There was no material showing that she had consented to a casual relationship irrespective of marriage.
  • Her consent was specifically linked to the assurance of marriage.
  • The Court did not base its conclusion merely upon the fact that Anurag later married another woman.
  • It relied upon the overlap between:
  • his assurances to the prosecutrix;
  • his knowledge of the other marriage arrangements;
  • his failure to disclose them.
  • Those circumstances allowed the court to infer his state of mind at the relevant time.
  • The case illustrates the evidentiary principle that intention may be proved by conduct before, during and immediately after the relevant transaction.
  • However, the judgment should not be read as creating a presumption that every failed relationship involves a fraudulent promise.
  • Each case requires proof that the promise was dishonest when made.

Conclusion

  • The Supreme Court held that Anurag’s promise to marry was false from the beginning.
  • He had no genuine intention of marrying the prosecutrix when he induced her consent.
  • Her consent was therefore obtained under a misconception of fact.
  • The conviction was maintained.
  • The sentence was reduced from ten years to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment.
  • The Evidence Law significance lies in the use of surrounding circumstances to infer a concealed dishonest intention.