Evidence Law

Daya Singh v. State of Haryana

AIR 2001 SC 1188; (2001) 3 SCC 468

Facts

Armed assailants attacked the house of Dr Harnam Singh at night.
Several members of the household were killed or injured.
Electric bulbs were burning in the courtyard, providing light during the occurrence.
Dr Harnam Singh and his wife, Jaswant Kaur, had a close and direct encounter with the attackers.
They:
saw the assailants at short distance;
grappled with them;
suffered injuries; and
watched them fire upon family members.
One assailant was particularly remembered as having distinctive “cat-like eyes.”
Daya Singh was arrested several weeks later.
A test identification parade was arranged shortly after his arrest.
Daya Singh refused to participate, alleging that the police had already shown him to the witnesses.
The Magistrate or Tehsildar responsible for the parade recorded the refusal.
During the trial, the injured witnesses identified Daya Singh in court.
The defence argued that:
no valid test identification had taken place;
court identification occurred after a long delay;
identification for the first time in court was inherently unsafe.

Whether identification in court is admissible without a successful test identification parade.
What evidentiary consequence follows when an accused refuses to participate in a parade.
Whether the delayed court identification was reliable on the facts.

Facts establishing the identity of a person are relevant under Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act, corresponding to Section 7 BSA.
Identification in court is substantive evidence.
A test identification parade is not substantive evidence.
Its purposes are primarily:
to test the witness’s memory during investigation;
to assure investigators that they are proceeding against the correct person; and
to corroborate later identification in court.
As a rule of prudence, identification of a stranger should ordinarily be tested promptly through a fair parade.
Absence of a parade is not automatically fatal where:
the witness previously knew the accused;
the witness had an exceptional opportunity to observe him; or
the circumstances created a lasting impression.
An accused who refuses to participate without a convincing reason assumes the risk of the court drawing an adverse inference regarding the refusal.

The Court found that the witnesses’ encounter was not a fleeting roadside glimpse.
Dr Harnam Singh and Jaswant Kaur remained face-to-face with the assailants during a violent and prolonged struggle.
They had sufficient lighting and saw Daya Singh:
holding and using a firearm;
grappling with family members;
moving through the courtyard;
firing repeatedly.
Both witnesses were injured and had powerful reasons to remember the person responsible.
The unusual description of the assailant’s eyes provided an additional identifying feature.
Their testimony remained materially consistent despite extensive cross-examination.
The Court accepted the official evidence that a parade had been arranged promptly but Daya Singh refused to participate.
His allegation of prior police exposure was not supported by convincing material.
A person cannot unjustifiably refuse a properly arranged parade and later argue that the prosecution lacks parade evidence.
The Court also rejected the contention that passage of time automatically destroyed the value of identification.
Memory depends upon:
duration of observation;
intensity of the event;
lighting;
distance;
distinctive appearance;
the witness’s opportunity to concentrate.
Here, the traumatic close-range encounter created an enduring visual impression.
The failure of certain other witnesses to identify the accused did not erase the reliable identification by the two injured eyewitnesses.

The Supreme Court held that the court identification of Daya Singh was reliable and constituted substantive evidence.
The absence of a completed test identification parade was not fatal because:
one had been arranged;
the accused refused to participate;
the witnesses had an unusually strong opportunity to observe him.
The Court upheld Daya Singh’s conviction.
The case confirms that TIP evidence is corroborative, while the evidentiary value of dock identification depends upon the quality of the witness’s original opportunity to observe the accused.