Evidence Law

Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor

AIR 1947 PC 67

Facts

The case arose from violent conflict between rival village factions.
A group of accused persons was prosecuted for:
rioting;
murder;
related offences.
Some accused persons made statements to police while in custody.
Following those statements, police recovered weapons from concealed places.
The prosecution proved statements substantially resembling:
“I stabbed the deceased with a spear and hid it in the yard; I will produce it”;
“I and others beat the deceased and concealed the weapon at a particular place.”
The trial court admitted large parts of these statements.
It used not only the portion identifying the hidden place but also:
the admission that the accused had used the weapon;
the admission that the accused had attacked the deceased;
the narrative explaining the offence.
The accused argued that Sections 25 and 26 prohibited the police and custodial confessions.
They accepted that the limited discovery portion might be admissible but challenged the use of the wider confessional narrative.
Conflicting High Court decisions had interpreted Section 27 differently.

What constitutes the “fact discovered” under Section 27?
How much of a custodial statement may be proved?
Whether the statement that the accused used the recovered weapon was admissible.

Sections 25 and 26 exclude:
police confessions;
custodial confessions not made before a Magistrate.
Section 27 is a carefully limited exception.
Under the BSA, the discovery exception appears in the proviso to Section 23(2).
Only so much of the information as distinctly relates to the fact discovered may be proved.
The “fact discovered” is not merely the physical object.
It includes:
the place from which it is recovered;
the accused’s knowledge of its location;
the object’s connection with the information.
The admissible portion must have a direct and distinct relationship with the discovery.
Past-user statements such as “I murdered him with this knife” do not become admissible merely because the knife is later found.
The discovery confirms knowledge of concealment, not necessarily the truth of the entire confession.

The Privy Council rejected the idea that every sentence leading to recovery becomes admissible.
Suppose an accused states:
“I killed A with a knife and buried the knife under a tree.”
Recovery of a knife under that tree confirms:
that a knife was hidden there;
that the accused knew its location.
It does not, by itself, confirm:
that the accused killed A;
that the knife was used exactly as described;
that the complete narrative is true.
Therefore, the admissible portion would ordinarily be limited to:
“I buried or concealed a knife under the tree and will produce it.”
The words “I killed A with it” describe a past event not discovered through the recovery.
In the present case, the trial court had admitted portions stating that the accused had stabbed or beaten the deceased.
Those words amounted to confessional statements of participation.
Their truth was not distinctly confirmed merely because weapons were recovered.
The Court permitted proof of:
the accused’s information about concealment;
the location;
production of the weapons.
It excluded the parts directly acknowledging assault or murder.
The Court also rejected an overly narrow approach under which only the object itself is the discovered fact.
The relevant discovered fact included the accused’s special knowledge that the object was concealed at that location.
This formulation became the controlling test for Section 27.

The Privy Council held that Section 27 must be strictly interpreted.
Only the portion of custodial information distinctly related to the discovery is admissible.
Statements admitting that the accused:
attacked the deceased;
used the weapon;
committed murder, were inadmissible merely because the weapon was recovered.
Information concerning concealment and knowledge of location was admissible.
The Court adjusted the convictions after excluding the wrongly admitted confessional portions.