Evidence Law

Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan

AIR 1952 SC 54

Facts

Rameshwar was prosecuted for raping Purni, a girl approximately eight years old.
Purni gave evidence describing the assault.
Because of her young age, the trial judge questioned her to determine whether she:
understood the duty to speak truthfully;
possessed sufficient intelligence to testify.
The judge allowed her to give evidence without administering a formal oath.
Purni told her mother about the incident shortly after it occurred.
Her mother testified about:
the complaint;
the girl’s condition;
the circumstances in which the disclosure was made.
The Assistant Sessions Judge convicted Rameshwar.
On appeal, the Sessions Judge acquitted him, considering the girl’s evidence insufficiently corroborated.
The High Court restored the conviction.
Before the Supreme Court, Rameshwar argued that:
the child’s unsworn testimony was unsafe;
the victim of a sexual offence should be treated like an accomplice;
her mother’s evidence merely proved that a complaint was made;
there was no independent corroboration connecting him with the offence.

Whether a competent child may give evidence without oath.
Whether a prosecutrix is an accomplice.
Whether corroboration of a child or sexual-offence complainant is legally compulsory.
What type of evidence amounts to sufficient corroboration.

Under Section 118 Evidence Act, every person is competent to testify unless unable to:
understand the questions;
give rational answers.
The comparable BSA rule is Section 124.
The absence of oath does not automatically make the testimony inadmissible where the child is otherwise competent.
A prosecutrix is not an accomplice.
She is a victim rather than a participant in the offence.
There is no legal rule requiring corroboration of her testimony in every case.
Corroboration is ordinarily a rule of prudence where:
the witness is very young;
circumstances create special risks;
the judge considers additional assurance desirable.
The required corroboration:
need not confirm every detail;
must support the material story;
should reasonably connect the accused with the offence.
A prompt previous statement may corroborate testimony under Section 157 Evidence Act, now Section 160 BSA.
The corroborative statement must be made:
at or about the time of the occurrence; or
before an authority legally competent to investigate.

The trial judge had questioned Purni and was satisfied that she could understand and answer rationally.
Her young age did not make her incompetent.
The formal omission of an oath affected neither admissibility nor validity where the statutory conditions were satisfied.
The Court rejected the comparison between a victim of rape and an accomplice.
An accomplice voluntarily participates in the offence and may seek favour by implicating another.
A child victim occupies an entirely different position.
Nevertheless, because Purni was very young, the court appropriately looked for assurance.
Her complaint to her mother was made at the earliest natural opportunity.
The statement was not a later narrative invented after prolonged discussion.
Her mother’s testimony did more than prove that some complaint occurred.
It corroborated the identity of Rameshwar and the essential allegation.
Section 157 permits a previous consistent statement to support later testimony.
Corroboration need not independently prove the whole offence.
If it did, the victim’s testimony would become unnecessary.
It was sufficient that the prior complaint materially supported her account and connected Rameshwar with the assault.
The Court also explained that an appellate court should not presume that a trained judge ignored the prudential need for caution merely because a formal warning was not written in conventional language.
The complete evidence justified reliance upon the child.

The Supreme Court held that Purni was a competent witness despite her age and absence of oath.
A prosecutrix is not an accomplice, and corroboration is not an inflexible legal requirement.
Her prompt complaint to her mother supplied sufficient corroboration under Section 157.
The High Court was correct in restoring the conviction.
Rameshwar’s appeal was dismissed.