Evidence Law

Sonu alias Amar v. State of Haryana

(2017) 8 SCC 570

Facts

Sonu and other accused persons were prosecuted in connection with:
kidnapping;
abduction;
sexual assault;
murder.
The prosecution relied upon call-detail records and mobile-phone evidence.
The records were produced during the trial through witnesses connected with the telecom service providers.
No timely objection was raised that:
the Section 65B certificate was absent or defective;
the witnesses were not the proper persons;
the mode of proving the call records was irregular.
The accused cross-examined the witnesses and allowed the records to be marked and considered.
The trial court and High Court relied upon the call records along with other evidence.
Before the Supreme Court, the accused raised for the first time an objection based upon Anvar P.V.
They argued that the call-detail records were legally inadmissible because Section 65B had not been properly satisfied.

Whether an objection to the mode of proving electronic evidence can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court.
What is the difference between:
inherent inadmissibility;
an irregular mode or method of proof?
Whether failure to object at trial amounts to waiver.

An objection that evidence is completely prohibited by law may generally be considered even at a later stage.
An objection concerning the mode of proof must ordinarily be taken when the evidence is tendered.
Timely objection serves two purposes:
it warns the party producing the evidence;
it permits the defect to be cured.
If no objection is made and the document is admitted, a party cannot ordinarily challenge its method of proof only after the trial is completed.
Section 65B certification concerns the statutory method by which a copied electronic record is authenticated.
Under Arjun Panditrao, the certificate remains mandatory, but it may be produced later and its absence can often be cured when timely identified.
The distinction between substantive inadmissibility and curable mode of proof therefore remains important.

The accused knew during trial that call-detail records were being produced and relied upon.
They could have objected that:
a certificate was missing;
the certificate lacked particulars;
the witness was not competent;
the records had not been properly generated.
Had the objection been taken then, the prosecution could have:
called an authorised telecom official;
supplied a proper certificate;
produced additional technical evidence.
By remaining silent, the accused allowed the trial to proceed on the assumption that the mode of proof was accepted.
The prosecution had lost the practical opportunity to cure the defect by the time the matter reached the Supreme Court.
Permitting a first-time objection would reward strategic silence.
The Court therefore treated the complaint as one concerning the mode of proof rather than a case where the subject matter was inherently prohibited.
It also examined whether the call records were the sole foundation of conviction.
They formed only one component of a broader evidentiary case.
The decision did not remove the Section 65B requirement for future cases.
It laid down a procedural rule:
objections capable of cure must be raised at the earliest stage.
Arjun Panditrao later confirmed that certificates remain mandatory but may be obtained or produced during the proceeding.

The Supreme Court refused to entertain the Section 65B objection raised for the first time at the final appellate stage.
The accused had waived the objection concerning the mode of proof by failing to raise it during trial.
The call-detail records could not be excluded at that late stage on that ground.
The convictions were not disturbed merely because of the belated electronic-evidence objection.